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I. INTRODUCTION
Philosophy functions as a tool for tax lawyers. The various schools 
of philosophy are akin to a toolkit with different tools for differing 
projects where the more tools the tax lawyer knows how to use, the more 
effective he or she will be in the practice of tax law. However, scholarly 
research in the field of taxation is often not guided by philosophy. And, 
when a philosophical reference is given, such is rarely developed in a 
pluralistic manner. The most common citations given in tax scholarship 
are to Adam Smith,1 John Locke,2 and increasingly within law journals, 
to John Rawls.3 Modern research in tax law thus often takes a Rawlsian 
balancing approach based on evaluative criteria identified by Adam 
Smith or John Stuart Mill.4 This is the determination in tax law of the 
class of legal reasons that can be used to justify tax laws or legal 
opinions.5 The approach predominantly reflects “Moral Philosophy” 
where the idea is to identify “justice” with respect to tax laws.6 The 
intense focus on one particular school of philosophy is like using a 
hammer for any and all possible tasks; hence, from pounding nails to 
pounding screws, we can be fairly sure that tax scholars will generally 
set out to solve a problem using the philosophical hammer of Adam 
* Senior Lecturer (Associate Prof.), University of Surrey (UK), School of Law.
1. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
(5th ed., London, Strahan & Cadell 1789) (1776); see also DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (London, John Murray 1817). 
2. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690); see also THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN: OR THE MATTER, FORME, AND POWER
OF A COMMON-WEALTH ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL (n.p., n. pub. 1651). 
3. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (2nd ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (Cambridge,
Mass., Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971). 
4. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (London, John W. Parker & Son 1859). 
5. Id. at 561 (“Every theory of law (or jurisprudence) provides an account of the conditions
of membership in the class of legal reasons.”). 
6. See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 215, et seq. (London,
S. W. Dyde trans., George Bell & Sons 1896); see also Jules Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, 
Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 554-55 (1993) (“Instead of illuminating the 
conceptual or theoretical commitments of our practices, normative theories set out the conditions 
under which certain practices and institutions could be justified or defended. Though analytic and 
normative theories differ in their purposes, they are not always unconnected.”). Coleman & Leiter 
identify philosophy of language as providing an account of conceptual and theoretical commitments 
of linguistic practices as de facto relevant to law. Id. at 555.  
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Smith, John Locke, or John Rawls. 
This singular focus on Moral Philosophy is not reflective of the 
current practice of tax lawyers, or the research of tax scholars. At times, 
the conversation amongst tax lawyers shifts over to causative effects of 
tax policy more characteristic of the “Philosophy of Science”.7 
Occasionally, a tax scholar will point out that tax evaluative criteria 
seem to be culturally determined as indicative of “Philosophy of 
Language.”8 Tax research is increasingly undertaken from the 
perspective of economic psychology that sets out to study the “social 
norms”9 of taxpayer behavior, which is premised, in part, on 
“Philosophy of Mind.”10 Nonetheless, research in this field does take 
human thought as objectively rational and self-interested, which is 
precisely why it is called economic psychology.11 Such a presumption of 
self-interested rationality in human behavior is typical of the philosophy 
of “Law and Economics.”12 If the philosophical orientation is extended 
beyond economics, there would be at least the potential for 
considerations of the “common good” or even altruism.13 The 
7. See KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (Routledge 1992).
8. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G. E. M. Anscombe trans.,
4th ed. Wiley-Blackwell 2009); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 
(Princeton Univ. Press 1979); see, e.g., Omri Marian, Meaningless Comparisons: Corporate Tax 
Reform Discourse in the United States, 32 VA. TAX REV. 133, 140 (2012). But see Bret N. 
Bogenschneider, Wittgenstein on Why Tax Law is Comprehensible, 2015 BRIT. TAX REV. 252. 
9. ERICH KIRCHLER, THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX BEHAVIOUR (Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2007). 
10. RENÉ DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD FOR CONDUCTING ONE’S REASON WELL 
AND OF SEEKING TRUTH IN THE SCIENCES (Donald A. Cress trans., 3rd ed., Hackett Publishing 
Company 1998) (1637); see, e.g., John Prebble, Ectopia, Tax Law and International Taxation, 1997 
BRIT. TAX REV. 383. 
11. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960); GUIDO 
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Yale Univ. Press 
1970); Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS, VOLUME I. 790 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., Elgar 2000). 
12. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (9th ed., Wolter Kluwer 2014); see 
also Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rational 
Choice Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000). But see Jeanne L. 
Schroeder, The End of the Market: A Psychoanalysis of Law and Economics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
483 (1998); Bret N. Bogenschneider & Mathias Kasper, The Human Subconscious and Taxation, 
5:4 INT. J ECON. & BUS. LAW 8 (2016), citing SIGMUND FREUD, VORLESUNGEN ZUR EINFÜHRUNG 
IN DIE PSYCHOANALYSE (Frankfurt/Main, Fischer 1998) (1916-17); JACQUES LACAN, THE SEMINAR 
OF JACQUES LACAN: BOOK 1 & 2 (Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988). 
13. See SÖREN KIERKEGAARD, THE SICKNESS UNTO DEATH (Princeton Univ. Press 1983)
(1849); KIERKEGAARD, KIERKEGAARD’S WRITINGS, XVI: WORKS OF LOVE (Howard V. Hong & 
Edna H. Hong eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1995) (1847); FRANCIS HUTCHESON, AN INQUIRY INTO 
THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS OF VIRTUE AND MORAL GOOD (Wolfgang Leidhold ed., Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund 2004); see also Bret N. Bogenschneider, Tax Jurisprudence with Benevolence & Love, 
25 KANSAS J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 65 (2015). 
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philosophical question of how to know “rational” behavior has been 
largely excluded from tax journals over the strident objections of critical 
tax scholars, which would otherwise reflect an approach of “Critical 
Legal Studies” taken here as a form of “deconstructionism.”14 The basic 
presumption of nearly all tax research, however, is that tax avoidance 
must be moral and ethical when achieved within the bounds of the law.15 
Tax scholars further presume to know the bounds of the tax law 
notwithstanding the fact that tax planning and adjudicative outcomes are 
indeterminate in actual practice.16 This leads to another area of 
philosophy referred to herein as “Legal Philosophy.”17 Of course, in tax 
law there is always a tax code, so tax scholars sometimes debate the 
implicit definition of “tax law” in relation to the code, and ask whether 
the common law of taxation, or principles of international tax law, might 
be also a source of justification for legal interpretation.18 A common 
type of legal interpretation in tax law centers on “logical positivism,”19 
not to be confused with other more coherent types of “legal 
positivism.”20 
14. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan
trans., 2nd ed., Vintage Books 1995); Bret N. Bogenschneider, Foucault and Tax Jurisprudence: On 
the Creation of a “Delinquent” Class of Taxpayer, 8 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 59 (2015). 
15. See, e.g., Frans Vanistendael, Judicial Interpretation and the Role of Anti-Abuse 
Provisions in Tax Law, in TAX AVOIDANCE AND THE RULE OF LAW 131-154 (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publ. BV 1997); Zoë M. Prebble & John Prebble, Comparing the General Anti-Avoidance Rule of 
Income Tax Law with the Civil Law Doctrine of Abuse of Law, BULL. INT´L TAX’N 151 (2008). But 
see Bret N. Bogenschneider, Professional Ethics for the Tax Lawyer to the Holmesian “Bad Man”, 
49 CREIGHTON L. REV. 775 (2016). 
16. See John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule
Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1993); Bret N. Bogenschneider, 
Manufactured Factual Indeterminacy and the Globalization of Tax Jurisprudence, 4:2 U. C. 
LONDON J. L. & JURIS. 250 (2015). 
17. For further background on various schools of “Legal Philosophy” see H. L. A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW (3rd ed. 2012); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON 
LAW AND ITS STUDY (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (1930); HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 
(Max Knight trans., from the 2nd German ed., The Lawbook Exchange 2005) (1960); Hans Kelsen, 
The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L. REV. 44 (1941). 
18. See, e.g., KLAUS VOGEL ON DOUBLE TAXATION CONVENTIONS at 39 (4th ed., Ekkehart
Reimer et al. eds., Wolters Kluwer 2015); J. Scott Wilkie & Peter Hogg, Tax Law within the Larger 
Legal System, 52:2 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 460 (2015); Bret N. Bogenschneider, Is Tax Law 
Subordinated to Contract Law in Transfer Pricing Matters?, 7:1 TRANSNAT´L LEGAL THEORY 
(forthcoming 2017). 
19. See Jeffrey Brand-Ballard, Kelsen’s Unstable Alternative to National Law: Recent
Critiques, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 133, 143 (“[L]ogical positivism proclaimed that only such statements as 
are logically warranted or empirically verifiable are meaningful; all else is nonsense. Armed with 
such principles what havoc must we make of our law libraries? With what confidence now do we 
take in our hand any legal treatise or textbook?”) citing Richard Tur, The Kelsenian Enterprise, in 
“Essays on Kelsen”, 157.  
20. See John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5 ½ Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 199 (2001). 
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol50/iss3/3
2016] A PHILOSOPHY TOOLKIT FOR TAX LAWYERS 455 
The proposal to use another area of philosophy for tax research, 
such as Philosophy of Language, to better resolve some problem of 
taxation is like presenting a craftsman with a new tool for the job. The 
tax lawyer can then weigh whether that new tool might have advantages 
or disadvantages over more conventional tools. But, for the most part, 
tax scholars do not investigate whether their own research is part of a 
larger philosophical framework with its own implicit methods and 
presumptions. Karl Popper referred to this sort of doctrinal entrenchment 
as “conventionalism.”21 Perhaps for this reason, we do not really have a 
pluralistic form of tax scholarship or knowledge akin to scientific 
pluralism as advocated by Paul Feyerabend.22 
Unfortunately, this means relatively straightforward criticisms 
could prove potentially devastating for tax law as a whole. For example, 
the indeterminacy critique of tax law has the very real potential to 
invalidate much of the prior research in taxation premised on legal 
determinacy in one fell swoop. Another way of saying this is that it is 
entirely plausible for a sharp critic of tax research to argue that all of tax 
scholarship is flawed in some significant way. Pluralistic knowledge 
about taxation or any subject is beneficial because it renders a form of 
acquired immunity to these sorts of existential challenges. Such strong 
challenges must periodically arise in any scholarly discipline. Thomas 
Kuhn referred to doctrinal challenges as “paradigm shifts.”23 John 
Maynard Keynes did exactly that with respect to economic theory.24 
Ludwig Wittgenstein did it with philosophy.25 Albert Einstein did it with 
theoretical physics.26 The more entrenched tax scholars are in thinking 
they know what they know about taxation, the more drastic such 
paradigm shifts will be when they ultimately occur. 
By way of illustration, if tax research was linked to philosophy, 
scholars could orient tax research within the broader scope of 
21. POPPER, supra note 7, at 59 (“Whenever the ‘classical’ system of the day is threatened by 
the results of new experiments which might be interpreted as falsifications according to my point of 
view, the system will appear unshaken to the conventionalist. He will explain away the 
inconsistencies which may have arisen; perhaps by blaming our inadequate mastery of the 
system.”). 
22. See PAUL K. FEYERABEND, REALISM, RATIONALISM AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD: 
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, VOLUME 1 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1981). 
23. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (4th ed., Univ. of
Chicago Press 2012). 
24. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND 
MONEY (Macmillan Cambridge Univ. Press 1936).  
25. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 8. 
26. See ALBERT EINSTEIN, RELATIVITY: THE SPECIAL AND GENERAL THEORY (Robert W.
Lawson trans., 1916). 
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philosophical thought. In this way, tax policy could be categorized as 
one might categorize other tools used for research projects. Such an 
approach might dramatically improve the direction of tax research by 
revealing the larger picture of how ongoing tax research fits into the 
larger framework of human knowledge. This amounts to taking an 
inventory of the tools available for tax projects before embarking on a 
research project in taxation. But, to do so, it requires categories of 
philosophy relevant to tax policy and this is, in and of itself, 
problematic. One goal of this paper is to determine what labels to put on 
the categories of philosophy. The labels proposed here are the respective 
schools of philosophical thought to which the underlying tax research 
ostensibly relates, namely: Moral Philosophy, Legal Philosophy, Law 
and Economics, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy 
of Language, and Critical Legal Studies. 
Skeptics of the potential relevance of philosophy to tax law should 
immediately ask why it is we should set out to categorize tax research in 
such a manner. After all, won´t these new categories make tax research 
even more convoluted than it already is? One response to this question is 
that the categorization of tax theory renders philosophical thinking more 
accessible. Take for instance how important the organization of books in 
a library is to the library patrons. If books are just dumped in a pile on 
the floor, then finding a relevant book entails shifting through a lot of 
books that are not relevant to the research at hand. A modern electronic 
word search on a particular issue of taxation also does not help us very 
much in identifying research particular to a school of philosophical 
thought. Furthermore, if we think of tax knowledge in pluralistic terms, 
then we would want to explore it in an interdisciplinary fashion taking 
into account differing schools of thought which may not be reflected in a 
word search. And, if we think current and future tax scholars have the 
ability to choose the best method for tax research, then there is no harm 
in having pluralistic knowledge. 
A second response to the question of why we ought to categorize 
tax research using philosophy is that philosophy constitutes not only a 
tool, but also instructions, for how to better employ existing tools that 
may already be in the tax lawyer´s toolkit. Existing tax research appears 
to provide lots of excellent guidance on how to use the particular tools of 
Moral Philosophy and Law & Economics, in particular. But, such an 
intense doctrinal focus on these areas is bad for the field of tax law, if 
simply because these two fields do not work very well for all projects in 
tax law. Indeed, if one were to start setting out pertinent “crimes” against 
legal scholarship, one might start with the crime of “destruction of 
6
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intellectual evidence” in the failure to include other fields of philosophy 
in legal scholarship, and not “intellectual voyeurism” where 
philosophical citation in law is at times found to be substandard.27 This 
is to say, the discipline of taxation should be willing to accept varied 
attempts by tax scholars to try out new tools for projects in tax law, even 
if many of these attempts turn out to be unsuccessful. 
Another potential objection to this proposed systemization project 
is that “legal theory” is actually not necessary in the practice of law. 
Here, the word “theory” is used partly as a pejorative term for 
philosophy. Sometimes critics say that philosophy is not “practical” for 
law. This claim implies that the tax lawyer making such a claim does not 
comprehend how their thinking may already be unwittingly shaped by 
philosophy. Also, in some cases the tax lawyer may prefer to proceed 
without any tool (i.e., using their bare hands, so to speak). For example, 
Judge Sneed at one point simply listed the “criteria of Federal income 
tax policy” and then invited the reader to subjectively divine his or her 
own criteria.28 The Chief Justice has also said that philosophy, as applied 
to law, is not relevant to the bar. As discussed in detail below, Daniel 
Farber referred to legal theory in a negative manner in his “case against 
brilliance” in which he found much of legal theory to be “too clever by 
half.”29 According to Farber´s view, if there is such a thing as “tax 
jurisprudence,” it accordingly has nothing to do with philosophy but 
would be reflected in the written opinions of the respective judges 
deciding tax cases. Another version of this argument is that lawyers and 
judges simply solve problems that are all idiosyncratic. David Howarth 
argued along similar lines that transactional lawyers are akin to 
engineers that solve such problems.30 And, tax lawyers represent perhaps 
the quintessential example of the transactional lawyers which Howarth 
had in mind. 
To respond to the idea that legal theory is unnecessary, Howarth´s 
argument could be modified slightly to say tax lawyers are more like 
plumbers. The tax lawyer qua plumber has a metaphorical truckload full 
of tools. Each time the plumber encounters a new problem, he decides 
which tool to use for the job. One immediate means to identify a good 
27. See Part III(a).
28. Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567 
(1965). 
29. See Part III(b).
30. DAVID ARMINE HOWARTH, LAW AS ENGINEERING: THINKING ABOUT WHAT LAWYERS 
DO (Edward Elgar 2013); see also Bret N. Bogenschneider, Book Review: Law as Engineering by 
David Howarth, 132:3 L. QUARTERLY REV. 518 (2016). 
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plumber is that a good plumber cheerfully appraises the leak when he 
arrives, pronounces what tool will be necessary, gets the tool from the 
truck, and the leak is soon fixed. So, that means, first and foremost, any 
good plumber has devised an organization system such that he can lay 
his hands on the appropriate tool when the need arises. A bad plumber 
despondently appraises the leak when he arrives, declares he does not 
have the appropriate tool for the job, and then ultimately takes a great 
deal of time and plumber´s putty to complete the repair. If asked why the 
project took so long, the bad plumber will say that this was not his fault 
since the problem reflected an externality to his usual approach to 
plumbing repairs. A really devastating critique of a plumber is 
accordingly to say something like: Don’t you think you should be using 
an o´wrench on that pipe? Similarly, trouble arises in taxation when 
lawyers and scholars fail to acknowledge how their thinking is 
inadvertently shaped by philosophy or when they draw upon a 
suboptimal theory for the particular job at hand. With the wrong tool, we 
need to start making excuses for why the theory doesn´t work very well 
and need to apply a lot of lawyer´s putty. As John Gardner wrote: “We 
must have respect for both our plumbers and our philosophers or neither 
our pipes nor our theories will hold water.”31 So, it is not so much an 
engineering-type project to solve a specific problem that characterizes 
tax lawyers, but instead the specialized language (i.e., tools) we choose 
that identifies tax lawyers. 
Another preliminary issue that deserves mention is that of Richard 
Rorty and his general objection to language as a “tool.”32 Rorty´s 
objection would be along the lines of the following: It is actually 
impossible for you to give these categories of philosophy potentially 
relevant to taxation in anything other than language, and when you 
propose to use these categories as a tool, that just reflects on you.Your 
categories for philosophy and taxation are therefore just like a mirror. 
So, all you could do with this project is to describe yourself and the 
31. JOHN W. GARDNER, EXCELLENCE: CAN WE BE EQUAL AND EXCELLENT TOO? 102 
(Revised ed., W. W. Norton & Co. 1995) (1961). 
32. See Part II(f). For a discussion of a comprehensive view of economic theory as taking
into account various types of “instruments” or “tools” see LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF 
TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 13, 20 (2008) (“Comprehensiveness indicates the need to 
consider all pertinent policy instruments. One would not ordinarily want to use a screwdriver or a 
knife to pound nails if a hammer were available. Likewise, in considering how one might employ 
estate and gift taxation to raise revenue or increase redistribution, the availability of the income tax 
should be kept in mind. . . . Arguably the greatest modern contribution of economics in this field has 
been to broaden the focus with regard to the available tool set and to offer incisive analysis that 
indicates which tool or combination of tools is best depending on the particular characteristics of a 
given setting, such as the quality of the government’s information.”). 
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categories you think are important for tax law. In the best case, you 
would be merely describing the categories that other tax lawyers think 
are important in your community of tax professionals. This is then 
merely edifying philosophy and is a form of conversation among a 
localized community of tax experts. To wit, one response to Rorty is that 
tax law is not purely edifying. And, that non-edifying aspect of tax 
language represents a significant problem with his “post-analytic” 
philosophy in general. Tax language represents the means to solve 
problems that are very real for democracy and mankind in general. 
Practical knowledge about tax law is akin to knowledge about how to 
dig a well or how to build city walls. As Jürgen Habermas said in 
response to Rorty: “In the lifeworld actors depend on behavior 
certainties. They have to cope with a world presumed to be objective, 
and, for this reason, operate with the distinction between believing and 
knowing. There is a practical necessity to rely intuitively on what is 
unconditionally held to be true.”33 Simply put, to derive tax policy in the 
modern day, we require technical expertise and language representing 
specialized discourse. This knowledge of how to use tax language is 
what tax lawyers know how to do. 
Deconstructionists might also pose a further query as follows: But, 
how do you know which language-”tool” works better or worse for tax 
law.  Your criterion for judging results are not really objective. 
Examples can be given where different tools work better in different 
contexts or do not work at all in some cases. However, in plumbing as in 
taxation, we are concerned with a particular repair job, not the 
objectivity of categories in general. In other words, tax law is a 
Wirtschafts-oriented inquiry, not metaphysics. For example, each of the 
philosophical methods described herein to include Moral Philosophy and 
Philosophy of Mind can bear directly on why a three-quarters wrench is 
better suited than an o´wrench for a particular plumbing repair job. The 
same is true for whether progressive taxation is a good tax policy.34 A 
pluralistic knowledge of taxation is potentially essential to that sort of 
practical decision-making with respect to the particular problems that 
tax lawyers routinely encounter. 
Philosophy is occasionally alleged to be “impractical” to tax law.35 
33. Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn, in RORTY AND HIS CRITICS 31, 49
(Blackwell Publishers 2000). 
34. See Richard A. Westin, The Historical Origins of Progressive Taxation, 23 J. JURIS. 203 
(2014). 
35. See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992).  
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The idea is that tax lawyers should be looking solely to tax statutes or 
cases and not trying to divine an underlying theory of tax law. However, 
at least with respect to tax enforcement practices, the taxing authority 
increasingly seems to pick and choose winners when it comes to taxes.36 
To the extent that claim is true, the theories of enforcement practices are 
an important criteria for tax planning, which must depend on some 
philosophy of enforcement applied by the taxing authority. Furthermore, 
both tax research and adjudication are premised on theory, whether the 
tax practitioner is aware of it or not. So, when a practitioner calls 
philosophy and taxation “impractical,” it is analogous to a swordsmith 
calling gunpowder impractical. 
II. THE PHILOSOPHICAL TOOLKIT FOR TAX LAWYERS
A favorite pastime of many philosophers is bickering about the 
respective categories for philosophy. Once the categories are agreed 
upon, then philosophers like to identify themselves within a particular 
category of philosophical thought. The categories are typically defined 
with respect to the name of a philosopher. For example, many 
philosophers identify as “Wittgensteinian,” meaning they see the role of 
language as predominant in philosophy. Philosophers also like to bicker 
about what famous philosophers really thought about a specific issue. 
Along these lines, much of doctrinal philosophy resembles a form of 
mind-reading of dead philosophers and what they likely would have 
thought about a contemporary issue. This aspect of doctrinal philosophy 
is fascinating at times, but from a tax law perspective it looks like 
something many philosophers do mostly for entertainment between and 
amongst themselves. This doctrinal approach also results in a form of 
intellectual authoritarianism where modern scholars determine who can 
speak and how to speak about philosophical issues. In the application of 
philosophy to tax law contemplated here, we have good reasons to reject 
these methods of doctrinal philosophy. 
Importantly, if we think of tax law and jurisprudence as a form of 
entertainment for philosophers, then Rorty is correct in stating that 
philosophical discourse is merely edifying. But, in most cases, 
philosophy in the context of taxation is not merely edifying and 
therefore has a much larger role to play in tax law. In contrast, if we 
think of philosophy in the historical terms of GWF Hegel, as 
“philosophy is its own time wrapped up in thoughts,” then the study of 
36. Leigh Osofsky, Some Realism about Responsive Tax Administration, 66 TAX L. REV. 121 
(2012). 
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taxation may be just a historical progression.37 And, in parallel fashion, 
in a democratic process taxation could be a manifestation of free-will.38 
Notably, the Greeks had ideas about taxation at the origin of democracy 
itself that were perhaps well suited to democracy in Ancient times.39 
The remainder of this paper is designed to identify and critique the 
respective schools of philosophy likely to be relevant to taxation. The 
strongest criticism of each school of philosophy is described. In addition, 
the prior claims from legal philosophers regarding “intellectual 
voyeurism” and impractical brilliance are rejected as forms of doctrinal 
authoritarianism. Interdisciplinarity in tax research is further identified 
as what amounts to tool-making by tax lawyers. Original source citation 
is also given to works by the great philosophers, which will hopefully be 
of use to future tax scholars. 
A. Moral Philosophy
Here, Moral Philosophy refers to philosophy relating to the
determination of right and wrong or justice in the context of taxation. 
Morality is of paramount importance to tax law, especially in Anglo-
American tax jurisprudence. Any reference to moral categories in 
taxation implies natural law because the origins of justification are in 
something other than the positive law of taxation (i.e., the tax code).40 
As a simple example, tax jurisprudence premised on natural law means 
the teachings of the Old and New Testament (such as Romans 13:6-7) 
that illustrate principles of good behavior with respect to taxation.41 
These principles of good behavior are then taken as embodied in the tax 
law. In that sense, tax law should embody moral principles of behavior, 
the source of which might be in religious texts or some other means of 
determining moral behavior, such as moral philosophy. However, this 
idea is strongly rejected in various jurisdictions around the world. In 
particular, Continental Europe and Latin America rely on positive 
37. See generally HEGEL, supra note 6, at 21; HEGEL, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF
PHILOSOPHY, VOL. I. (E. S. Haldane trans., London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 
1892). 
38. See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS: AN ESSAY ON PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
ONTOLOGY (Hazel Barnes trans., 1956). 
39. See Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Democracy, Equality, and Taxes, 54 ALA. L. REV. 415 
(2003). 
40. See Roger Paul Peters, Tax Law and Natural Law, 26 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 29 (1950);
see Bret N. Bogenschneider, 5 ½ Problems with Legal Positivism and Tax Law, Pepperdine Law 
Review (forthcoming 2017) citing John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5 ½ Myths, 46 AM. J. JURIS. 
199, 199 (2001). 
41. Romans 13:6-7. 
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methods of legal interpretation where principles arise from a civil code. 
This issue is addressed in detail in the subsequent section on Legal 
Philosophy where legal positivism is concerned with identifying what is 
referred to as “legal validity.”42 
Other ideas are also captured in the category of Moral Philosophy, 
such as ideas of “just,” “fair,” or “evil” taxes. Jeffrey Schoenblum 
famously went down the path of trying to identify objective “fairness” in 
taxation.43 Schoenblum´s investigation ultimately ended with his feigned 
chagrin at the impossibility of the task of determining what fairness 
means in the context of taxation and then an argument for equal taxation 
due to such moral relativism. Likewise, economists are often opposed to 
any discussion of “fairness” in tax policy because there is no agreement 
on what that “fairness” means. So, where an economics professor 
complains of “normativity” in tax jurisprudence, the professor is also 
really objecting to Moral Philosophy apart from economic conceptions 
of morality as applied to taxation. Economists prefer to use other moral 
categories (e.g. efficiency) and sometimes refer to everything other than 
economics as “normative.”44 This methodology is discussed in more 
detail in the section on Law & Economics below.45 
1. Moral Philosophy & Taxation
The most common use of Moral Philosophy in tax jurisprudence
today is with the ubiquitous citation in law journals to John Rawls.46 Tax 
scholars cite to Rawls when they want to compare competing moral 
arguments using a Rawlsian balancing approach. For example, a 
Rawlsian approach has been applied extensively in the context of social 
analysis of contemporary tax proposals.47 Notably, a personal freedom to 
be free from taxation is not one of the core “freedoms” that comprise the 
Rawlsian “basic liberties” such as freedom of speech, person, or thought. 
And, since the freedom from taxation is not a “basic liberty,” the 
Rawlsian “difference principle” can be invoked to weigh the benefits of 
42. See Part II(b).
43. Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Tax Fairness or Unfairness? A Consideration of the
Philosophical Bases for Unequal Taxation of Individuals, 12 AM. J. TAX POL´Y 221 (1995). 
44. See, e.g., Ken Judge & Iain Paterson, Poverty, Income Inequality and Health (New 
Zealand Treasury, Working Paper 01/29, 2001), www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/research-
policy/wp/2001/01-29/twp01-29.pdf. 
45. See Part II(c)
46. See, e.g., Linda Sugin, Theories of Distributive Justice and Limitations on Taxation:
What Rawls Demands from Tax Systems, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1991, 1994 (2004). 
47. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Updating the Welfare State: Marriage, the Income Tax, and
Social Security in the Age of Individualism, 66 TAX L. REV. 695 (2013). 
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taxation from redistributive taxation against the costs. Another common 
usage of Moral Philosophy in the context of taxation is by Libertarian 
theorists of various stripes where taxation is taken as a violation of 
liberty to varying degrees.48 A common theme is the idea of the “social 
contract” or the relation of the individual to the state.49 But, perhaps the 
most famous restatement of Moral Philosophy in tax terms was given by 
Richard Epstein in Taxation in a Lockean World.50 Epstein´s work 
synthesized the purported philosophical foundations of tax jurisprudence 
with economic theory in many respects. 
2. Critique of Moral Philosophy & Taxation
The problem of knowing what is “right” or “fair” is an old problem
in legal philosophy.51 Any application of Moral Philosophy can 
accordingly be immediately critiqued by simply applying a different 
standard of morality. If there are multiple types of “right” in taxation 
then this seems to lead to “moral relativism.”52 Indeed, it is entirely 
plausible, and at times certain, that different moral outcomes could result 
from applying different iterations of moral philosophy. Such a 
methodological critique of moral philosophy has gradually been 
48. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974); Randy E. Barnett,
Afterword: The Libertarian Middle Way, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 349 (2013); Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Death, 
Taxes, and Property (Rights): Nozick, Libertarianism, and the Estate Tax, 66 ME. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
49. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Economic Efficiency and the Lockean Proviso, 10 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL´Y 401 (1987). 
50. Richard A. Epstein, Taxation in a Lockean World, 4:1 SOC. PHIL. & POL. 49 (1986). 
51. As Coleman & Leiter explained: “For a very long time, the leading analytic jurisprude,
Ronald Dworkin, appears to have defended the claim that adjudication was about finding the right 
answer to legal disputes, although he no longer claims that there are right answers to all cases.” 
Coleman & Leiter, supra note 6, at 562, n.23 (“In his earlier work, including Taking Rights 
Seriously, Dworkin had a ‘rights-based’ political theory, according to which the point of 
adjudication was primarily to determine which of the litigants had the preexisting right. If there was 
a preexisting right in each case, then there was a right answer in each case: namely, that which 
answered the question: which litigant has the right? In his more recent work, especially Law’s 
Empire, adjudication is a practice within a differently conceived political morality-one that 
emphasizes the bonds of liberal community (citing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). In 
such an account, there is no need that adjudication settle on uniquely correct answers to all disputes, 
and thus Dworkin relaxes the constraint. That does not mean that he no longer believes that there 
are correct answers almost all the time. His continued use of the Hercules construct as a way of 
fixing right answers to legal disputes indicates that he is still committed to much more in the way of 
determinacy than most positivists.”). 
52. Moral relativism is characteristic of Kelsenian legal theory. See Brand-Ballard, supra 
note 19, at 137-8 (“Although Kelsen adopts conclusions similar to those of Austin, he arrives at 
them by means of an argument premised on moral relativism. . . . Kelsen, by contrast, embraces the 
meta-ethical position known as moral relativism and argues that premise to the conclusion that law 
and morality are separable spheres.”). 
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undertaken in the context of taxation, with references to other moral 
standards including religious ethics.53 The prior Libertarian analyses of 
taxation were sharply critiqued by David Duff in a seminal article of tax 
jurisprudence.54 New applications of morality to tax jurisprudence are 
possible, and represent a worthy research project for any tax scholar 
because different moral standards might apply better or worse than the 
Rawlsian or Libertarian theory to future tax problems 
But, the strongest critique of “Moral Philosophy” was given by 
Friedrich Nietzsche.55 Nietzsche challenged the idea of morality entirely, 
which is different than Schoenblum´s claim that we just don´t know how 
to identify morality. This is also not a Rawlsian balancing of different 
moral aspects of a tax policy issue. To Nietzsche, morality is an artifice 
created by the herd to control the oberman, and so is tax law. The 
creation of morality, and also law itself, is really the exercise of the 
Will-to-Power over others.56 Accordingly, there is no moral duty to obey 
moral standards. For example, the oberman might set out to create a tax 
law for other people and then defy it himself. The Nietzschean critique 
of morality also represents a form of “deconstructionism” as explained 
below in the section on Critical Legal Studies.57 Notably, a Nietzschean 
critique of tax jurisprudence is not answerable on the grounds that tax 
law is not premised on liberalism,58 since tax jurisprudence is expressly 
premised on liberalism. 
B. Legal Philosophy
Legal Philosophy refers here to explanations of the theoretical and
conceptual commitments of legal practices.59 Much of the scholarship in 
53. See, e.g., Susan Pace Hamill, An Evaluation of Federal Tax Policy Based on Judeo-
Christian Ethics, 25 VA. TAX REV. 671 (2006); Susan Pace Hamill, An Argument for Tax Reform 
Based on Judeo-Christian Ethics, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2002); Robert W. McGee, Is Tax Evasion 
Unethical? 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 411 (2004). 
54. David Duff, Private Property and Tax Policy in a Libertarian World: A Critical Review, 
18 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 23 (2005). 
55. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, WILL TO POWER §§ 13, 259 (Walter Kaufmann ed., R.J.
Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books 2011) (1901). 
56. Since tax jurisprudence is premised expressly on political liberalism nearly all the time it 
is appropriate to use the classic criticism of liberalism in this context. See, e.g., Bret N. 
Bogenschneider, The Will to Tax Avoidance: Nietzsche and Libertarian Jurisprudence, 2014 J. 
JURIS. 321. 
57. See Part II(g).
58. See Leiter & Coleman, supra note 6, at 553. 
59. Note that it would also be theoretically possible for Legal Philosophy to be applied as an
analytical critique of tax law from a purportedly “neutral” perspective of pure logic or the like. See 
Thomas Morawetz, Understanding Disagreement, the Root Issue of Jurisprudence: Applying 
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the field relates to explanations of how judges decide or ought to decide 
cases. As apart from taxation, Legal Philosophy is generally taken to 
comprise its own internal branch of philosophy. The foremost scholars 
in the field include HLA Hart,60 Ronald Dworkin61 and Karl 
Llewellyn,62 among many others,63 yet none of these great works are 
typically extended to tax law or jurisprudence. The reason for this was 
inadvertently given by Coleman & Leiter when they defended analytical 
legal philosophy against critiques given by Critical Legal Studies that 
law was not consistent with principles of “liberalism” since it was not 
determinative, objective, or neutral. Coleman & Leiter wrote: 
The same can be said about liberal jurisprudence. No analytic juris-
prude-not Dworkin, not Hart, not Fuller, not Raz, nor anyone else-has 
ever referred to his or her jurisprudence as “liberal.” This is so in spite 
of the fact that Dworkin, Hart, and Raz are arguably among the most 
important figures in political liberalism of the last half of this centu-
ry.64 
But, with respect to tax jurisprudence, the disavowal of political 
liberalism just doesn’t seem apropriate—John Rawls’ second book was 
indeed entitled: Political Liberalism.65 Perhaps the majority of all tax 
jurisprudence is expressly attributed to the concepts of political 
liberalism with a key concept of “tax neutrality” and a ubiquitous belief 
in the determinacy of the tax code. The general failure of contemporary 
scholars in the field of Legal Philosophy to address tax jurisprudence is 
further discussed below in the section on “Interdisciplinarity in Legal 
Scholarship.”66 
1. Legal Philosophy & Taxation
Here, “Legal Philosophy” refers to positive law approaches to the
theory of taxation. First and foremost among these is the Pure Theory of 
Wittgenstein to Positivism, Critical Theory and Judging, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 371, 393 (1992). 
60. See H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593 (1958).  
61. See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975). 
62. See Grant Gilmore, Book Review: The Bramble Bush (reviewing K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE 
BRAMBLE BUSH (1951), 60 YALE L. REV. 1251 (1951). 
63. See Brian Leiter, Beyond the Hart-Dworkin Debate: The Methodology Problem in
Jurisprudence, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 17 (2003); Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 749 (2013); Dennis M. Patterson, Law’s Pragmatism: Law as Practice and Narrative, 76 VA.
L. REV. 937 (1990).
64. Coleman & Leiter, supra note 6, at 553.
65. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (Columbia Univ. Press 1993).
66. See Part IV.
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Law given by Hans Kelsen. Wolfgang Schön also recently referred to the 
“German method of tax interpretation” as akin to a focus on “black letter 
law.”67 The reason why this methodology is particularly important 
relates to the distinction between common law and civil law 
jurisdictions. The fundamental idea is that law is comprised of “norms” 
encapsulated in the positive law. Positive legal scholars often refer to 
“principles,” meaning the legal norm extrapolated from the statute. The 
“pure” theory of law accordingly means that the principles are derived 
from the tax law itself. After the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties,68 some Continental European tax scholars began to 
disparagingly refer to American tax jurisprudence as “sociology,” 
meaning that it is not “pure” legal interpretation derived solely from the 
tax statute.69 
2. Critique of Legal Philosophy & Taxation
A common challenge to positive law methods of legal interpretation
is what is often referred to as the “indeterminacy critique.” Legal 
indeterminacy is defined here as the inability to determine legal 
outcomes based on the tax code itself. Indeterminacy critiques are 
directed against predominantly “black-letter law” methods of 
interpretation. Partly in an attempt to mitigate the problem of legal 
indeterminacy, the U.S. Treasury Department issues tax regulations 
(referred to as “Treasury Regulations”) to clarify the framework of the 
underlying positive tax code. Other nations often do not issue tax 
regulations, so in marginal cases it is relatively hard to see how a legal 
interpretation could be gleaned from the “framework” of the tax code 
itself. Nonetheless, this regularly occurs with respect to tax treaty 
interpretation, and even with tax treaties that are just a few pages in 
length. As part of its Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) 
initiative,70 the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (“OECD”) is now calling for reform in tax treaty 
interpretation and other similar aspects of international tax law that often 
lead to abuse through the filling in of “gaps” in positive tax law as part 
67. Wolfgang Schön, Tax Law Scholarship in Germany and the United States (Max Planck
Institute for Taxation and Public Finance, Working Paper 2016-07, 2016). 
68. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31-2, opened for signature May 
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
69. See George Fitzmaurice, Vae Victis or Woe to the Negotiator? Your Treaty of Our
Interpretation of It, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 358 (1971). 
70. See Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55 (2014). 
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of aggressive tax planning.71 
A further problem with Legal Philosophy as applied to tax law 
relates to the origin of “facts” to be used in the legal analysis in both 
common and civil law jurisdictions. For example, where a tax code 
provides “fact”—words or even definitions of “facts”—the question is 
how to know the content of these words; indeterminacy as to the fact 
content of words is referred to as “factual indeterminacy.”72 Coleman & 
Leiter described a similar concept as the determining of “legal facts;”73 
furthermore, the finding of “facts” may also be a function of legal 
custom or adjudicatory practice.74 Although of crucial importance to tax 
law, such factual indeterminacy represents a subset of general legal 
indeterminacy particularly relevant to tax law. Michael Potács has 
argued in some areas of law the fact content of words is derived from 
everyday language.75 Another idea, which was first developed by Ernst 
Mach in the debate over the fact content of words used in science, is that 
content is derived from theory.76 In tax law, the content of “fact” words 
is known based on the theory of tax law comprised in significant part by 
the heuristics or special language of tax lawyers. This approach, as 
developed by Bogenschneider in a series of papers, explains how tax 
lawyers are able to proceed with a different understanding of the 
meaning of the word “hybrid,” for example, which refers to a type of 
legal entity in tax law and not an automobile as in everyday language. 
C. Law & Economics
The foremost idea of Law and Economics is that human behavior
either is both rational and self-interested, or, can be coherently 
understood as if it were rational and self-interested. In a series of 
articles, Thomas Ulen comprehensively developed this philosophical 
71. BEPS Action 6: Prevent Treaty Abuse (2015), www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/revised-
discussion-draft-beps-action-6-prevent-treaty-abuse.pdf. 
72. Bogenschneider, Manufactured Factual Indeterminacy, supra note 16, at 250-52. 
73. Coleman & Leiter, supra note 6, at 559 (“Let us characterize [the concern over
objectivity] as a worry about the metaphysical objectivity of ‘legal facts.’ Any time a judge renders 
a decision, she asserts the existence of what we are calling a legal fact; for example, ‘Coleman’s 
failure to inspect constitutes negligence,’ or ‘Leiter’s failure to deliver constitutes a breach of 
contract.’ The question about metaphysical objectivity, then, is the question about the status of these 
facts, that is, about whether they hold independently of what a particular judge happens to think, or 
perhaps independently of what all lawyers and judges would think.”). 
74. Id. at 617 (“If legal facts are fixed by the practices of judges, then legal facts will reflect
how judges regard them.”).  
75. MICHAEL POTÁCS, LEGAL THEORY (Kluwer 2015). 
76. ERNST MACH, DIE ANALYSE DER EMPFINDUNGEN UND DAS VERHTILTNIS DES
PHYSISCHEN ZUM PSYCHISCHEN (Jena: G. Fischer 1922). 
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approach, arguing: 
[E]ven if there were consumers who behaved irrationality [sic] . . . the
standard predictions of price theory would still hold. . . . Therefore,
while irrationality might still be an issue with respect to the behavior
of certain individuals, it is not an issue with respect to aggregate be-
havior in markets and may, as a result, be ignored.77
Economic theory is premised on the work of Jeremy Bentham, who 
proposed the concept of “utility” to intersubjectively measure the 
pleasures and pains of persons.78 So, individual persons are sometimes 
described in economic terms as “lightning appraisers of pleasure and 
pain.”79 The measure of utility can accordingly be quantified for 
empirical analysis. One objective of economic analysis is to achieve 
Pareto Optimality where no person can be made better off without 
making another worse off.80 Various aspects of the economic theory thus 
overlap as reflected in the work of Ronald Coase where “social cost” is 
an efficiency criteria measured by utility. However, the field of Law and 
Economics often relates law more directly to money, where wealth 
maximization is taken as a proxy for utility maximization.81 The 
methods and moral justification for such a wealth-maximization 
approach in law was significantly developed by Richard Posner and 
famously challenged by Ronald Dworkin.82 
1. Law and Economics & Taxation
The composite approach of Libertarian theory and economics is
what many scholars take to be “tax jurisprudence” as relevant to tax law. 
However, many economic theories of taxation are disputed by scholars. 
The study of tax incidence on the question of who bears the burden of 
77. Ulen, supra note 11, at 794 (citing Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic
Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1962)). 
78. See George J. Stigler, The Development of Utility Theory. I, 58:4 J. POL. ECON. 307 
(1950). 
79. See WILLIAM S. JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Palgrave Macmillan
UK 2013) (1871).  
80. VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Aldo Montesano et al. eds.,
Oxford Univ. Press 2014) (1906).  
81. See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
509 (1980). 
82. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 
(1979). But see Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980); see also 
Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization Revisited, 2 NOTRE DAME J. LAW, ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 
85 (1985). 
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taxation is particularly controversial.83 Also, basic questions about how 
tax policy effects economic growth are highly controversial.84 However, 
notwithstanding the inherent controversy, the research questions which 
economists choose to address are often of interest to non-economic 
scholars, thus rendering the analysis meaningful and relevant to the field 
of taxation. The tax literature relating to economic theory is the most 
comprehensive of any area of philosophy relevant to taxation. The 
research is so extensive that economists are sometimes said to have 
“colonized” other fields, including taxation.85 The positing of a 
pluralistic framework for tax law undertaken in this paper is 
fundamentally inapposite to this understanding of tax jurisprudence. In 
identifying “tax jurisprudence” as limited to these exclusive methods, 
this excludes other epistemologies, or means of knowing things about 
taxation.86 
Economics, as applied to taxation, is premised on philosophy of the 
Enlightenment Era. A point of major confusion is the work of Richard 
Epstein in which he applied economic ideas to taxation taken in 
particular from Ronald Coase, as well as ideas about Pareto Optimality, 
but referred to these as “Lockean” theory.87 The line between Moral 
Philosophy and law and economics was thereby blurred. The resulting 
confusion has rendered the philosophical foundations of economics 
unclear, so scholars engaged in economic theory often cite to moral 
philosophers.88 Economics also proceeds at times through empirical 
methods premised on the observation of behavior of persons to be 
evaluated with statistical methods, broadly a type of “econometrics.”89 
83. See Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. 
ECON. 215 (1962). 
84. See JANE GRAVELLE & DONALD MAPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 7-5700, TAX RATES 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2015) https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42111.pdf. 
85. Donald N. McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics, 21:2 J. ECON. LIT. 513 (1983)
(“[E]conomics has become imperialistic. There is now an economics of history, of sociology, of 
law, of anthropology, of politics, of political philosophy, of ethics. The flabby methodology of 
modernist economics simply makes this colonization more difficult, raising irrelevant 
methodological doubts in the minds of the colonized folk.”). 
86. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto
Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 331 (2003). But see Christopher 
Taggart, Fairness Versus Welfare: The Limits of Kaplow and Shavell’s Pareto Argument, 99 MARQ.
L. REV. 661 (2016). 
87. See generally Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal
Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REV. 889, 933 (1992).  
88. See, e.g., Takuo Dome, Adam Smith’s Theory of Tax Incidence: An Interpretation of His
Natural-Price System, 22:1 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 79 (1998); Nava Ashraf, Colin F. Camerer & 
George Loewenstein, Adam Smith, Behavioral Economist, 19:3 J. ECON. PERSP. 131 (2005).  
89. See MARY S. MORGAN, THE HISTORY OF ECONOMETRIC IDEAS: HISTORICAL 
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However, the gathering of data observations in respect of taxation (or 
anything else) is a theory-laden endeavor.90 Furthermore, as Frank 
Ramsey (and also Karl Popper) explained, the use of probability to study 
observations comprises a measurement of the conformance of the 
experimental results to the expectation of the person conducting the 
experiment.91 
2. Critique of Law & Economics and Taxation
Perhaps the most cogent critique of economics is simply that
economic advice is rendered in what amounts to “fortune-teller style.”92 
This method famously resulted in President Harry Truman´s request for 
a “one-armed economist.”93 In some econometric studies, researchers 
run regression analysis on the dataset and then derive the hypothesis 
from the results, a process often referred to as “data-mining.”94 This 
process now also referred to as “p-hacking” does not follow the 
“scientific method.”95 Furthermore, we should not expect the results 
from data-mining methods to be meaningful descriptions of cause-and-
effect because of the failure to control for spurious results which would 
otherwise occur via the a priori statement of hypotheses for testing.96 
Also, studies by the Federal Reserve have shown that most econometric 
PERSPECTIVES ON MODERN ECONOMICS (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990). 
90. POPPER, supra note 7, at 90 (“[T]he theoretician must long before [experimentation] have 
done his work, or at least what is the most important part of his work: he must have formulated his 
question as sharply as possible. Thus it is he who shows the experimenter the way. But even the 
experimenter is not in the main engaged in making exact observations; his work, too, is largely of a 
theoretical kind. Theory dominates the experimental work from its initial planning up to the 
finishing touches in the laboratory.”). 
91. BARRY GOWER, SCIENTIFIC METHOD: AN HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
INTRODUCTION 187 (Routledge, 1997) (“For [Ramsey], probabilities as degrees of belief are 
subjective rather than objective; they represent psychological states. ‘There really do not seem to be 
any such things’, Ramsey declared, ‘as the probability relations he describes.’”) (citing Frank 
Ramsey Truth and Probability, in FP RAMSEY FOUNDATIONS: ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHY, LOGIC,
MATHEMATICS AND ECONOMICS (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1978)). 
92. See Bret N. Bogenschneider, How Helpful is Econometrics to Tax Research? 21:3 NEW 
ZEALAND J. TAX L. & POL’Y 292, 301 (2015). 
93. See ON THE THIRD HAND: HUMOR IN THE DISMAL SCIENCE, AN ANTHOLOGY (Caroline 
Postelle Clotfelter ed., Univ. Michigan Press 1996) (“As President Truman said, ‘I wish that I had a 
one-armed economist, so that he wouldn’t say on the one hand and on the other hand.’”). 
94. Bogenschneider, supra note 92, at 305 (“Thesis 4: The use of statistical ‘data-mining’ 
(that is, test, re-test, re-re-test) as a research methodology does not follow the scientific method and 
applies it in reverse.”). 
95. See Christie Aschwanden, Science Isn´t Broken, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 19, 2015)
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/science-isnt-broken/#part1. 
96. For an example of spurious results in taxation, see James R Hines, Jr. & Eric M. Rice,
Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business, 109 QUART. J. ECON. 149 (1994). 
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analyses are not replicable.97 Human preferences also change over time 
(referred to as “ergodicity”), so it is not clear that empirical methods 
alone can render predictions about economic events that will hold true 
for very long. 
The use of Pareto Optimality (i.e., a situation where no person can 
be made better-off without making someone else worse-off) as an 
evaluative criterion in taxation has also turned out to be problematic for 
several reasons. First, utility maximization is not equivalent to wealth 
maximization (as the current growth in economic inequality in the 
United States makes abundantly clear).98 Therefore, Pareto Optimal 
increases in aggregate wealth do not necessarily translate into overall 
welfare gains for society. Second, scholars have derived arguments that 
property taxation cannot be Pareto optimal.99 However, these arguments 
depend on the idea of money as a form of property. Wealth taxes can be 
Pareto optimal where large accumulations of money are taxed 
proportionately and the relative standing of wealth holders in property is 
maintained relative to each other.100 
D. Philosophy of Science
Here, “Philosophy of Science” refers to the study of causation in
the context of taxation; if tax policy and decisions are determined in part 
based on efficient outcomes (or other measures of consequences of 
taxation), then Philosophy of Science is critical to legal interpretation 
insofar as one must be able to predict the outcome of alternative 
options.101 
A classic version of the philosophy of scientific discovery was 
given by Karl Popper.102 Popper´s work is often credited as the origin of 
“science” premised on the falsification of hypotheses as opposed to the 
confirmation of hypotheses by empirical observations.103 Popper´s 
97. See Richard G. Anderson & William G. Dewald, Replication and Scientific Standards in
Applied Economics a Decade After the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking Project, 76:6 FED. 
RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 79, 81 (1994). 
98. See generally Thomas Piketty & Immanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States,
1913-1998, 118 QUART. J. ECON. 1 (2003). 
99. See Daniel Attas, Fragmenting Property, 25 LAW & PHIL. 119, 147 (2006). 
100. Bret N. Bogenschneider, A Challenge to the Libertarian Challenge, 2017 J. JURIS. 1. 
101. Leiter once adopted such an approach to scientific theory as a criticism of legal realism,
writing as follows: “And if no theory of the appropriate sort exists, then prediction is not possible; 
and if prediction is not possible, then we are back where we started-with liberal concerns and 
worries that are not met by existing practice.” Coleman & Leiter, supra note 6, at 584. 
102. POPPER, supra note 7. 
103. POPPER, supra note 7, at 66. 
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methodology entails the testing of theory by theory.104 Popper´s work 
was subsequently critiqued by Paul Feyerabend.105 Feyerabend opposed 
in significant part the positivist import of Popper´s method where an 
objective methodology of science could be known. However, 
Feyerabend allowed for an idea of “science” as scientific pluralism.106 
Tax research can be thought of in pluralistic terms where hypotheses are 
tested by falsification. Another common means of understanding the 
scientific method is the Bayesian theory of science where hypotheses are 
tweaked over time with the positing of auxiliary hypotheses.107 Many 
natural scientists think of the scientific method in Bayesian terms 
because it is difficult to give examples where hypotheses are falsified 
outright in Popperian terms in the natural sciences; rather, most theories 
of natural science are augmented with auxiliary hypotheses. In the field 
of taxation, however, there do seem to be theories of taxation that appear 
to have been falsified outright, such as the “Laffer curve” and “small 
open economy” model.108 
1. Philosophy of Science and Taxation
The question of whether the study of tax law is in the nature of
“science” depends on the applicable definition of “science” one wishes 
to apply, and the respective assessment of the current state of tax 
research. Of course, it is beyond any reasonable dispute that when it 
comes to taxation, many claims to “truth” or “science” are held out with 
respect to tax policy. The measurement of effective tax rates are a prime 
example.109 However, even where components of tax research are 
performed in a subjective, biased, or non-scientific manner, that does not 
mean the overall field of taxation must be rendered non-scientific. 
104. Id. at 91 (“We choose the theory which best holds its own in competition with other
theories; the one which, by natural selection, proves itself the fittest to survive.”). 
105. FEYERABEND, supra note 22. 
106. Id. 
107. See Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the
Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 875 (2002). 
108. See Kimberly A. Clausing, In Search of Corporate Tax Incidence, 65 TAX L. REV. 433 
(2012); Bret N. Bogenschneider, The Tax Paradox of Capital Investment, 33:1 J. TAX’N OF INV. 59 
(2015). 
109. E.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah & Yaron Lahav, The Effective Tax Rate of the Largest US and
EU Multinationals, 65 TAX L. REV. 375 (2012); with Martin Sullivan, The Truth About Corporate 
Tax Rates, FORBES (March 25, 2015, 8:15 AM), www.forbes.com/sites/taxanalysts/2015/03/25/the-
truth-about-corporate-tax-rates/#6a4565fa20a5 (“It’s a rock-solid fact that the U.S. corporate 
statutory tax rate is the highest among developed nations and is significantly higher than the 
average. According to 2014 data from the OECD, the combined federal and state statutory corporate 
tax rate for the United States is 39.1 percent.”). 
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“Science” in the context of taxation means the positing of hypotheses 
related to causation and falsification or augmentation thereof. It follows 
then that we want to gather as much information as possible about 
causation as it relates to taxation or tax policy. As such, the overall field 
of taxation is not necessarily improved by stamping out non-scientific 
methods in the study of taxation; we may learn something even from 
mistaken research. The scholars that are vehemently opposed to some 
idea or another in taxation have already arrived at an absolute truth about 
tax policy in their own mind and thereby pursue tax research as akin to a 
war.110 But, this is not a scientific approach, at least where we think of 
tax knowledge in pluralistic terms. 
2. Critique of Philosophy of Science and Taxation
The foremost opponent of Philosophy of Science is not ignorance;
rather, it is a countervailing idea of “science” as the use of numbers to 
empirically confirm ideas about taxation. Popper referred to this idea as 
“naïve empiricism.” For example, economists often begin tax papers as 
follows: “This is what we know about xyz.”111 Such a statement 
amounts to an exclusive claim of knowledge about taxation premised on 
empirics. Much of the ongoing empirical research in taxation is 
premised on this alternate view of science where things can only be 
“known” with numbers. The value of theory in taxation is thereby 
diminished or eliminated entirely. The practical import to tax scholarship 
then is that since empirical data is usually of poor quality, we really 
cannot definitively “know” anything about taxation. Furthermore, the 
value of practitioners in the field (i.e., clinicians) including tax lawyers 
is thereby diminished or eliminated entirely. Under this countervailing 
approach to “science,” only the persons with access to data, namely 
economists, are able to draw hypothesis about taxation or to advise on 
tax policy. 
110. REUVEN S AVI-YONAH ET AL., COMPARATIVE FISCAL FEDERALISM: COMPARING THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE US SUPREME COURT’S TAX JURISPRUDENCE (Kluwer Law 
International 2007) (“The European and American federations are both survivors of past wars, and 
while it may be fairly said that tax policy itself is unrelenting warfare, the goal of sensible legal 
design is to constrain the belligerents in ways that lend these fights better tone and higher purpose 
than they might otherwise have had.”). 
111. See, e.g., Dhammika Dharmapala, What Do We Know About Base Erosion and Profit
Shifting? A Review of the Empirical Literature (Coase Sandor Institute for Law & Economics 
Working Paper No. 702, 2014); Alan J. Auerbach, Who Bears the Corporate Tax: A Review of What 
We Know, 20 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 1 (2006); Michael P. Devereux & Simon Loretz, What do We 
Know about Corporate Tax Competition? (Oxford Business School, Working Paper 12/29, 2012).  
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E. Philosophy of Mind
Here, “Philosophy of Mind” refers specifically to the mentalese
version of Cartesian thought as often applied in the context of 
taxation.112 The mentalese approach has often been applied to taxation 
reflecting a combination of “common-sense” (or “causal 
minimalism”)113 legal reasoning, combined with semantic formalism. 
The main idea is that tax law should match (or, refer to) ideas held by 
lawyers or judges in their minds (as a type of mental finger-pointing to 
legal concepts or empirical reality). Hence, the methodology is “what 
seems right is right;”114as the foremost example, the Chief Justice 
concluded that the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act was 
obviously not a capitation tax based on the idea that a capitation must 
apply equally to all taxpayers; hence, the provision did not match or 
refer to what the Chief Justice thought of as a capitation tax in his 
mind.115 
1. Philosophy of Mind and Taxation
The mentalese approach to taxation was crystallized in a series of
articles by John Prebble. Prebble´s idea is that law creates “fictions” 
apart from the empirical reality of tax and economics which he says are 
“incomprehensible;” in other words, the tax law does not seem to 
correspond to the “right” idea.116 The point is that tax law fails to 
correspond to an empirical reality and one cannot consistently point a 
finger to right tax interpretation out in the world.117 Thus, for Prebble 
112. Other aspects of philosophy of mind related to free will, intentionality or consciousness
are not included here but should also be linked to the theory of taxation in the future. 
113. See H. L. A. HART & TONY HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW, at xxxiv (2nd ed., Oxford
Univ. Press, 2002) (“According to ‘causal minimalism’, genuine causal issues are of small 
importance in settling questions of legal responsibility. In most instances they are confined to the 
issue whether the harm would have occurred in the absence of the wrongful conduct, and even this 
factual-sounding question is often answered in a way which owes more to considerations of legal 
policy than to any genuine attempt to determine the facts of the case.”). 
114. Id. at 607 (“At the other end of the continuum from subjectivism is the doctrine we will
call ‘strong objectivism.’ According to this view, what ‘seems right’ never determines what ‘is 
right.’ According to the strong metaphysical objectivist, what is the case about the world never 
depends on what humans take there to be (even under ideal epistemic conditions). According to the 
strong semantic objectivist, the meaning of a sentence never depends on what any speaker or 
community of speakers takes it to mean.”). 
115. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2599 (2012) (citing Hylton v.
United States, 3 U.S. 171, 175 (1796)). 
116. John Prebble, Why Is Tax Law Incomprehensible? 4 BRIT. TAX REV. 380 (1994). 
117. In the terms of legal philosophy this is a type of “strong objectivism” or “metaphysical 
realism”. See Coleman & Leiter, supra note 6, at 601 (“[B]ecause of its conception of the 
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and tax law, positive word categories seem to entirely fail the test of 
knowability (i.e., transferred understanding) in praxis. So, in respect of 
“fictions,” this refers to tax law words Prebble thinks are not 
representative of tax reality when compared against economic reality. 
The idea of “incomprehensibility” further refers to ideas taken from the 
tax law that Prebble does not purport to understand. In either case, the 
Philosophy of Mind methodology is paramount in Prebble´s approach. 
Perhaps the strongest argument for Philosophy of Mind to be used 
as the basis for tax law is where laws are designed to increase the 
confidence of the citizenry of the fairness or the functioning of the legal 
and tax system.118 The “idea” of the tax law reflected in the mental state 
of the taxpayer is then potentially more important than the actual 
substance of the tax law. In this context, tax scholars are concerned more 
with measuring behavior as a means to understanding it. The approach is 
linked to a “strong objectivity” approach characteristic of the hard 
sciences.119 
In terms of economic psychology, “taxpayer morale” is thus taken 
as the fundamental concept and a significant amount of tax research is 
devoted to measuring it.120 A significant aspect of behavioral research in 
economic psychology relates to “social norms.” The idea is for 
behavioral conformance in society. Such behavior is accordingly 
socially determinate rather than a rational individual calculation. This 
reflects the mental state of the taxpayer in the willingness to pay taxes to 
the state. For example, the United States enjoys the highest taxpayer 
morale in the world.121 The level of “taxpayer morale” appears to be the 
most significant factor for the success or failure of tax collections, not 
the law itself. Erich Kirchler has argued there is a “slippery slope” in the 
maintenance of taxpayer morale.122 A major debate within the tax 
independence of the world, metaphysical realism is committed to the ‘strong objectivity’ of ‘what 
there is.’”). 
118. Erich Kirchler, Erik Hoelzl, & Ingrid Wahl, Enforced versus Voluntary Tax Compliance:
The “Slippery Slope” Framework, 29 J. ECON. PSYCH. 210 (2008). 
119. See Coleman & Leiter, supra note 6, at 608 (“Strong objectivity, for example, figures in
our conception of scientific inquiry. We view scientists as trying to uncover the way the world 
really is; and the way the world is is independent of anyone’s beliefs or theories about it, all of 
which could turn out to be false.”). 
120. See James Alm & Benno Torgler, Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the United
States and in Europe, 27 J. ECON. PSYCH. 224, 241 (2006); Ronald G. Cummings, Jorge Martinez-
Vazquez, Michael McKee, & Benno Torgler, Tax Morale Affects Tax Compliance: Evidence from 
Surveys and an Artefactual Field Experiment, 70 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 447 (2009). 
121. See Ronald Inglehart et al., Codebook for World Values Survey (Ann Arbor, MI: Institute 
for Social Research, 2000). 
122. Id.
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literature deals with the idea of “cooperative compliance” for large 
multinational firms where audit resources are allocated away from large 
firms that want to be compliant.123 
2. Critique of Philosophy of Mind and Taxation
Ludwig Wittgenstein shifted philosophy away from Cartesian ideas
of knowing (“I think, therefore, I am”) toward linguistic analyses 
premised on agreement-in-use. This is often referred to as the 
“Linguistic Turn” in philosophy.124 A defense of tax law against 
criticism from the paradigm of Philosophy of Mind is that the special 
words actually are the understanding; ergo, “I speak tax, therefore, I 
think tax.” 
Separately, in terms of the methodology of behavioral empiricism 
now applied in behavioral psychology and taxation, famous criticisms 
against such an approach have been levied by Larry Summers, John 
Maynard Keynes, and Karl Popper. Summers argued that economists 
presume that the only meaningful questions are those which economists 
have set out to address, thereby excluding all other questions, for 
example, where empirical data may be unavailable.125 Keynes argued 
that statistical methods were unknowable and a form of “black 
magic.”126 Popper argued that empiricism reflects a form of inductive 
reasoning not suited to scientific inquiry.127 
F. Philosophy of Language
Here, the term “Philosophy of Language” refers to the use of
123. See OECD, COOPERATIVE COMPLIANCE: A FRAMEWORK: FROM ENHANCED
RELATIONSHIP TO COOPERATIVE COMPLIANCE (OECD publishing 2013), 
www.oecd.org/ctp/administration/co-operative-compliance.htm; Valerie Braithwaite, Responsive 
Regulation and Taxation: Introduction, 29 LAW & POLICY 3 (2007); John Braithwaite, The Essence 
of Responsive Regulation, 44:3 UBC L. REV. 475 (2011); Mark Burton & Justin H. Dabner, The 
Partnership Model of the Relationship between Tax Administrators and Tax Practitioners: Drivers, 
Challenges and Prospects, 11 J. AUSTL. TAX. 108 (2008). 
124. Habermas, supra note 33, at 39 (“Following the linguistic turn, however, all explanations
take the primacy of a common language as their starting point.”). 
125. Lawrence Summers, The Scientific Illusion in Empirical Macroeconomics, 93
SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 129, 145 (1991) (“Reliance on deductive reasoning rather than theory 
based on empirical evidence is particularly pernicious when economists insist that the only 
meaningful questions are the ones their most recent models are designed to address.”). 
126. John Maynard Keynes, On a Method of Statistical Business-Cycle Research. A Comment, 
50 ECON. J. 154, 156 (1940). 
127. POPPER, supra note 7, at 88 (“Thus the real situation is quite different from the one
visualized by the naïve empiricist, or the believer in inductive logic. He thinks that we begin by 
collecting and arranging our experiences, and so ascend the ladder of science.”). 
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linguistics in tax interpretation, particularly to the work of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and Richard Rorty. The issue relates to the method of legal 
interpretation applied to determine the respective meaning of words in 
tax statutes.128 Philosophy of Language has been described as a means to 
ascribe meaning to language including legal terms.129 The basic idea of 
agreement-in-use in the context of law and legal judgements was 
explained by Dennis Patterson as follows: 
Agreement is a necessary feature of the normativity of our practices, 
but the “agreement” must be a regularity in reaction to use. In short, 
when we say there must be “agreement in actions” what we are really 
saying is that there must be harmony in application, over time. This 
harmony in reaction and application is constitutive of all practices, in-
cluding legal practices. It is the basis of our legal judgements.130 
The idea of “agreement-in-use” in interpreting the meaning of words is 
appealing to the field of taxation because the meaning of terms can be 
radically indeterminate. An example of indeterminacy in the tax context 
is where multinational firms intentionally foster factual or legal 
indeterminacy as part of aggressive tax avoidance planning, such as by 
using a hybrid legal entity to simultaneously assert that an entity exists 
for tax purposes, but not otherwise.131 
1. Philosophy of Language and Taxation
Rorty argued (in contrast to Wittgenstein) that language was a form
of intersubjective discourse taken as edifying.132 Hence, agreement-in-
128. See Bogenschneider, supra note 8. 
129. Coleman & Leiter, supra note 6, at 555 (“[P]hilosophy of language provides an account
of the conceptual and theoretical commitments of our linguistic practices, the central aspect of 
which is the ascription of meaning. As part of the practice of ascribing meaning to words and 
sentences, we intend that the meaning of the word or sentence serve to constrain the uses to which 
the word or sentence can be put. Linguistic constraint is a normative concept; thus, analysis of 
meaning will be partially normative, setting out the conditions of justifiable use of words or 
sentences. Accordingly, an account of meaning that focused entirely on the history of the use of a 
term would fail because it could not explain the sense in which the meaning was intended, not 
merely to describe customary practice, but to constrain future use.”).  
130. Dennis Patterson, Wittgenstein on Understanding and Interpretation (Comments on the
Work of Thomas Morawetz), 29:2 PHIL. INVESTIGATIONS 129, 139 (2006). 
131. See Bret N. Bogenschneider, Factual Indeterminacy in International Tax Law, 3:1
BRICS LAW J. 73 (2016). 
132. RORTY, supra note 8, at 370-71 (“Edifying philosophers, unlike revolutionary systemic
philosophers, are those who are abnormal at this meta-level. They refuse to present themselves as 
having found out any objective truth (about, say, what philosophy is). They present themselves as 
doing something different from, and more important than, offering accurate representations of how 
things are. It is important because, they say, the notion of “accurate representation” itself is not the 
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use for language was always local and there would be no objectively 
given idea that could be valid in every possible context. Rorty argued 
that it would be impossible to know what future contexts would look 
like. Under this view, all debates, including that of law and taxation, are 
but of a larger conversation among mankind that could go in any 
direction.133 Habermas disagreed with Rorty on the point of the edifying 
use of language and argued that there exists practical usages of language 
which are universally valid.134 However, in the philosophy of language 
the meaning of words is taken not to be given by definitions, as is often 
the case in positive law analysis. Nor is the meaning of words given by 
reference to external objects under a linguistic theory of “semantic 
formalism,” which can be understood in lay terms as “finger 
pointing.”135 The rejection of either of these approaches to a law has 
major implications for legal theory. 
A foremost issue related to Philosophy of Language and taxation is 
whether words that are defined in the tax code may begin to take on new 
factual meanings as new contexts arise in the tax law in response to 
aggressive tax avoidance planning. Craig Latham referred to this as a 
“shift” in the meaning of words.136 If the factual meaning of words does 
not shift, then the tax code will become increasingly irrelevant as tax 
lawyers plan around the outdated meaning of defined terms with a 
concept that is slightly different. This issue of legal drafting and 
interpretation by principles or by definitions is perhaps the core issue of 
international tax law.137 Legal philosophers also discuss this key issue in 
proper way to think about what philosophy does.”). 
133. Id. at 378 (“To see keeping a conversation going as a sufficient aim of philosophy, to see
wisdom as consisting in the ability to sustain a conversation, is to see human beings as generators of 
new descriptions rather than being one hopes to be able to describe accurately.”). 
134. Habermas, supra note 33, at 37 (“On the [Rortyan] linguistic view, the subjectivity of
beliefs is no longer checked directly through confrontation with the world but rather through public 
agreement achieved in the communication community: a subjective consideration is one which has 
been, or would be, or should be, set aside by rational discussants.”).  
135. See Christian Zapf & Eben Moglen, Linguistic Indeterminacy and the Rule of Law: On
the Perils of Misunderstanding Wittgenstein, 84 GEO. L.J. 485, 501 (1996) (“The false picture 
described by Wittgenstein is, of course, the picture painted by semantic formalism – the theory that 
a word applies to particular items in the world because the word stands for an object that captures 
what the particular items have in common.”).  
136. Craig Latham, A Tax Perspective on the Infrastructure of Regulatory Language and a
Principled Response, 2012 BRIT. TAX REV. 65, 73; see also Coleman & Leiter, supra note 6, at 564 
(“In law, these concerns have been addressed in HLA Hart’s discussion of the distinction between 
the ‘core’ and ‘penumbra’ of general terms.”). 
137. See John Avery Jones, Tax Law: Rules or Principles?, 1996 BRIT. TAX REV. 580; Judith
Freedman, Improving (Not Perfecting) Tax Legislation: Rules and Principles Revisited, 2010 BRIT. 
TAX REV. 717. 
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tax jurisprudence as a type of “semantic skepticism” associated with 
Wittgenstein’s Private Language argument.138 
2. Critique of Philosophy of Language and Taxation
The arguments against Philosophy of Language taken in the context
of taxation are likely those of Hans Kelsen´s theory of public 
international law.139 Kelsen’s countervailing approach is that the norm 
must be the source of legal principles.140 So, where international tax law 
develops new words and concepts, these are not part of the positive law 
tax systems of nations. Brand-Ballard described the relevant part of 
Kelsenian theory (part of the Vienna Circle of the 1920s) as follows: 
The logical positivists argued for moral relativism on the basis of one 
of their central tenants: the verification principle. According to this 
principle, a statement (meaning an indicative sentence) is literally 
meaningful if and only if it is either (1) true or false by definition (“an-
alytic” or “analytically false,” respectively), or (2) empirically verifia-
ble by means of sensory experience. The verification principle is a se-
mantic thesis, according to which some statements are meaningful and 
other meaningless. “All bachelors are unmarried,” for example, is 
meaningful because it is true by definition. “Hans is in the bedroom” is 
also meaningful, but for the different reason that it can be confirmed or 
disconfirmed by empirical evidence: I can go to the bedroom and see 
whether Hans is there. Ethical statements such as “Killing is wrong” or 
“Promises ought to be kept,” however, are neither true-by-definition, 
false-by-definition, nor verifiable in experience. For this reason, the 
logical positivists deemed ethical statements to be not literally mean-
ingful (i.e., non-cognitive).141 
By this approach, all normative analyses of tax law (comprising perhaps 
the majority of Anglo-American jurisprudence generally) are sociology 
138. See Coleman & Leiter, supra note 6, at 565-66 (“There are a variety of considerations
normally associated with Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument that we can capture under the 
rubric of semantic skepticism. The semantic skeptic denies that there are objective facts of a suitable 
sort that constitute or determine a word’s or a sentence’s meaning. Because there is no fact that is 
the meaning of a sentence, the meaning of a sentence, directive, command, or request invariably 
will be indeterminate. In other words, what a sentence means cannot be adduced by pointing to 
some fact that is its meaning. Thus, the meaning of a sentence is indeterminate because there are no 
objective facts that would render it determinate. If this is true of language generally, then it is true of 
law a fortiori.”). 
139. See Joseph Raz, Kelsen´s Theory of the Basic Norm, 19 AM. J. JURIS. 94 (1974). 
140. See JOCHEN BERNSTORFF & THOMAS DUNLAP, THE PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
THEORY OF HANS KELSEN (Cambridge Univ. Press 2010). 
141. Brand-Ballard, supra note 19, at 139. 
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and not comprised of meaningful statements about law. Philosophy of 
Language would make the situation worse because it does not apply the 
analytical method described above. Accordingly, the framework of 
international law should instead proceed by formal treaties at the 
sovereign level and not by substantive understandings of words as 
determined by international tax experts. For example, where various 
nations began to call a discount on a bond “original issue discount” and 
tax that discount as if it were interest income, this concept of “original 
issue discount” would have no validity in a nation that did not 
incorporate that concept into its local law. Then, if a multinational firm 
set out to issue a discounted bond in a nation without that concept in its 
law, it could categorize the discount for tax purposes as something other 
than interest. As the alternative view, if international tax terms were 
taken as universally valid, a judge even in that location might identify 
the discounted bond as “original issue discount” and treat it as taxable 
interest, notwithstanding that terminology was not part of the positive 
law of the jurisdiction in question. 
G. Critical Legal Studies
Critical Legal Studies arose as an objection to the claimed
“objectivity” of authoritative legal scholarship and is taken here as a 
type of “deconstructionism” directed against tax jurisprudence.142 The 
source of legal rules is taken instead as premised on power dynamics of 
society.143 Deconstructive philosophy premised on an understanding of 
words taken in context is a possible foundation for Critical Legal 
Studies.144 John Balkin has identified at least three reasons as to why 
deconstructive theory is relevant to law.145 The same criteria reflect how 
Critical Tax Studies could be relevant to tax law. Balkin gave these as 
follows: (i) “First, deconstruction provides a method for critiquing 
existing legal doctrines . . . .”; (ii) “Second, deconstructive techniques 
can show how doctrinal arguments are informed by and disguise 
ideological thinking.”; (iii) “Third, deconstructive techniques offer both 
142. See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
561 (1983).  
143. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law,
with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 
(1982). 
144. See JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press 1997). For a comprehensive list of Derrida works and citations see Balkin in 
the following note.  
145. See J. M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743 (1987).
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a new kind of interpretive strategy and a critique of conventional 
interpretations of legal texts.”146 Critical scholars have also suggested 
that “a science of law is impossible, since legal norms are not 
descriptively factual.”147 
However, Critical Tax Theory has not been substantially linked to 
Critical Legal Studies. So, the project of setting forth the philosophical 
foundations of tax criticism as an alternative school of philosophy is in 
this respect largely incomplete. 
1. Critical Tax Theory and Taxation
Much of what has been labeled “Critical Tax Studies” (hereafter,
“Tax Crit”) relates primarily to fairness criticisms of the tax system 
premised on group identity.148 Tax Crit challenges “traditional” tax 
terminology, such as the word “tax equity,” and then sets out to 
substitute its own vocabulary for tax scholars.149 Numerous scholars 
argue that tax words are not acceptable because they reflect solely the 
experience of white,150 heterosexual,151 men.152 Others have argued that 
all tax terminology is a form of rhetoric.153 Tax Crit scholars then refuse 
to engage in tax discourse using such traditional tax words, essentially 
creating what amounts to tax dis-agreement in use. Storytelling is then 
proposed as the means to incorporate the experience of various groups 
with the tax system without using “traditional” tax words.154 This raises 
several well-known philosophical problems relating to the philosophy of 
language and radical subjectivity.155 
146. Id. at 745-6. 
147. Brand-Ballard, supra note 19, at 163. 
148. See, e.g., ANTHONY C. INFANTI & BRIDGETT J. CRAWFORD, CRITICAL TAX THEORY: AN 
INTRODUCTION (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009). 
149. Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191 (2008). 
150. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
790 (2007); Beverly I. Moran, Exploring the Mysteries: Can we ever know anything about Race and 
Tax? 76 N.C. L. REV. 1629 (1998). 
151. See, e.g., Nancy Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101 W. VA. L. REV. 
129, 135 (1998). 
152. See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, A Taxing Woman: The Relationship of Feminist
Scholarship to Tax, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 301, 310-11 (1997). 
153. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A
Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987). 
154. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV.
581, 589 (1990); Anthony C. Infanti, A Tax Crit Identity Crisis? Or Tax Expenditure Analysis, 
Deconstruction, and the Rethinking of a Collective Identity, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 707, 714-15 
(2005). 
155. See Michael A. Livingston, Radical Scholars, Conservative Field: Putting “Critical Tax
Scholarship” in Perspective, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1791, 1798 (1998). 
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2. Critique of Critical Tax Theory and Taxation
In philosophical terms, the justification for storytelling as a method
was given by Richard Rorty. However, neither Rorty nor Wittgenstein 
accepted the idea of incommensurability in language, or even conceived 
of intentional dis-agreement-in-use, where a tax lawyer intentionally 
refuses to speak in the terminology of tax lawyers as a form of “guerrilla 
warfare” against the underlying language of tax law.156 As a matter of 
philosophy of language, the objectivity of words is premised on 
agreement-in-use often referred to as the usage of “common 
language.”157 However, the problem of unintelligible language-use has 
been addressed by philosophers, particularly in the Max Black “inverted 
spectrum” problem.158 As an illustration, imagine a child whose mother 
teaches the child that the color “red” is actually the color “green.” The 
child then goes into the world and claims red is green. The child is 
subjectively correct about the colors. But, the child is not objectively 
correct. 
Thus, we can say that there are correct and incorrect usages of 
words, particularly with respect to taxation, even if these words are 
arbitrarily chosen by the local tax community of language users (or, even 
if the color red cannot be fully known without reference to green as 
illustration of what red is not). Jürgen Habermas has given an alternative 
defense of objectivity in language in general terms based on pragmatic 
necessity. However, none of this foundation for Critical Tax Studies has 
been significantly broached in the existing literature. A postmodern 
critique of Critical Tax Studies is possible, challenging the philosophical 
foundations of radical subjectivity in the context of taxation, as 
epitomized by storytelling as epistemology. In the usage of language, 
some agreement is at minimum required in order to tell the story. For 
example, one might reasonably ask why we choose to tell the story in the 
English language, and not German or French, or some other language in 
which philosophy is often conducted. Also, in the absence of any 
epistemology for how to use critical tax theory to “know” tax results, 
there is no possibility that we could administer a tax system using such a 
methodology. This is to say, in Rortyan terms, the discourse on Tax Crit 
is purely edifying. With an idea of philosophy-as-”tool” we would then 
156. Anthony C. Infanti, Homo Sacer, Homosexual: Some Thoughts on Waging Tax Guerrilla
Warfare, 2 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 27 (2006). 
157. Habermas, supra note 33, at 39. 
158. RORTY, supra note 8, at 305 (citing Max Black, Linguistic Method in Philosophy in 
LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY (Ithaca 1949)). 
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rightfully exclude ideas that have no “tool”-value for tax projects. The 
means to render Critical Tax Studies relevant in the future is to anchor it 
in Critical Legal Studies, or existing deconstructive philosophy. 
III. CRITICISMS OF PHILOSOPHY AS APPLIED IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
The value of philosophy to law is controversial. Four of the main
critiques of the application of philosophy to law include: (i) “intellectual 
voyeurism”; (ii) the “case against brilliance”; (iii) philosophy as a sub-
discipline of Legal Philosophy; and (iv) philosophy as irrelevant to 
adjudication. Brian Leiter, the eminent legal scholar in philosophy, 
published several articles positing a sharp divide, or what he referred to 
as “boundaries,” between philosophy and law.159 Leiter went so far as to 
explain why “Philosophy of Science” is not relevant to law.160 But, it 
turns out that “Philosophy of Science” is highly relevant to tax law and 
jurisprudence.161 Here, several notable criticisms of philosophy as 
applied to legal scholarship are discussed including intellectual 
voyeurism and “the case against brilliance.” 
A. “Intellectual Voyeurism”
In the seminal article Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship,
Leiter also set out to essentially criminalize improper philosophy usage 
and citation in law journal articles.162 Leiter posited the “sub-standard 
interdisciplinary work of whose most striking feature is . . .  ‘intellectual 
voyeurism . . . .’”163 Leiter describes such “intellectual voyeurism” as a 
“cocktail party affection” for the works of Wittgenstein, Hegel, Rawls, 
Foucault, Rorty, Sartre, Habermas, Aristotle, and others, in law reviews. 
Leiter then attacked Jerry Frug’s interpretation of Nietzsche.164 The 
scholarly lesson was proposed by Leiter as “ill-preparedness” breeds 
contempt and that the great philosophers should be utilized intelligently 
rather than squandered.165 
Leiter’s “intellectual voyeurism” can be countered on both 
159. Brian Leiter, The Boundaries of the Moral (and Legal) Community, 64 ALA. L. REV. 511 
(2013). 
160. Brian Leiter, The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science
Would Not Make for Good Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 803 (1997). 
161. See Part II(d).
162. Brian Leiter, Intellectual Voyeurism in Legal Scholarship, 4 YALE J. LAW & HUMAN. 79
(1992).  
163. Id. at 80. 
164. Id. (citing Jerry Frug, Argument as Character, 40 STAN. L. REV. 869 (1988)).
165. Id. at 104. 
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technical and practical grounds. First, in terms of philosophy, the 
extraordinary problem with Leiter’s approach is that the argument had a 
chilling effect on the use of philosophy in fields such as taxation; 
scholars are now scared to get something wrong and just rely on 
common sense. The common-sense approach excluding philosophy from 
tax jurisprudence is worse than the disease. A further problem is that any 
new ideas will always be opposed to the doctrinal “conventionalism” of 
prior legal theory, and therefore, presumptively be considered “bad” by 
conventional legal scholars. So, the “discovery” aspect in legal research 
is important to the welcoming of advances in any field, including law. 
Simply put, we ought not to devise a system that criminalizes discovery 
in law, since that approach effectively throws out the baby with the 
bathwater. 
A second objection could be made on the practical grounds that 
many European universities already use Leiter’s approach whereas U.S. 
law schools find it beneficial for law to focus more on creativity in 
scholarship than authority.166 Martha Nussbaum further argued that legal 
scholars in the United States are not well educated in philosophy.167 
Kandel and Nussbaum likewise discount the potential value of creativity, 
especially by younger legal scholars. Deborah Rhode further assessed 
legal scholarship as follows: “[S]cholarship, like salmon breeding in the 
wild, is a high-risk, low-return activity. On average, it takes 6,000 eggs 
to get two fish capable of living to maturity. Does this mean that 5,998 
eggs are wasted? Only if there is a more efficient means of perpetuating 
the species.”168 The practical question for legal scholarship is thus not 
whether Frug´s description of Nietzsche was a “bad” egg in philosophy, 
but whether Frug somehow interfered with Leiter, for example, by 
publishing an article about Nietzsche that would be one of the two in 
6,000 ostensibly “good” eggs. 
166. See Randy Frances Kandel, Whither the Legal Whale: Interdisciplinarity and the
Socialization of Professional Identity, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 9, 18 (1993) (“Further, the decision to 
make law schools postgraduate institutions resulted in the study of law being separated from the 
study of philosophy, political science, economics, and other related subjects. Because the United 
States differs in this respect from almost every other nation, American law students do not absorb 
the law within an integrated intellectual matrix the way our international colleagues do.”). 
167. Martha C. Nussbaum, The Use and Abuse of Philosophy in Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 1627, 1644 (1993) (“How should we deal with this dilemma? I propose the following model. 
Law schools might employ one or two philosophers, preferably in a half time appointment. They 
would retain a strong connection to their disciplinary bas in philosophy, and continue teaching 
regular philosophy students.”). 
168. Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Scholarship, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1332 (2002). 
34
Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol50/iss3/3
2016] A PHILOSOPHY TOOLKIT FOR TAX LAWYERS 485 
B. The Case Against “Brilliance” in Law and Philosophy
Daniel Farber authored a series of essays critical of “novelty” in
legal interpretation.169 The first essay was famously entitled The Case 
against Brilliance. However, it might also have been entitled The Case 
against Law and Philosophy. Farber argued that the novelty of a legal 
argument was indicia of such argument’s invalidity where “invalidity” 
refers to the failure of the novel argument to correspond to the actual 
view of the judge as given in a legal ruling.170 Farber subsequently 
clarified this position to refer to what he calls “common sense,”171 where 
the “brilliant” idea might be called too-clever-by-half.172 Brilliant 
arguments are “too brilliant to be true.”173 
The examples given by Farber were the celebrated works of Ronald 
Dworkin in legal theory and Ronald Coase in economic theory. Under 
Farber’s approach, the uncommon sense proposal is presumed not be 
“true,” or it would already be part of the conventional understanding of a 
subject (such as a legal opinion). With regards to legal theory, Farber 
avers that if only a few legal scholars can understand Dworkin’s 
“brilliant” theory, for example, then judges could not be expected to 
have used such a theory in rendering a decision.174 Farber wrote: “The 
history of modern thought is largely about the defeat of common sense 
and its replacement by brilliant, counterintuitive theories.”175 Farber 
argues that any “brilliant” or novel theory is not helpful in practical legal 
terms for understanding how a decision was rendered or how a decision 
might be rendered in the future. 
One possible answer to Farber would be evident merely from the 
structure of this paper. Farber thinks there is a legal concept which needs 
169. Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REV. 917 (1986); Daniel A.
Farber, Brilliance Revisited, 72 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1987).  
170. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, supra note 169, at 919 (“This line of argument
suggests not only that brilliance is evidence of a theory´s invalidity, but also that it is likely cause of 
its invalidity.”).  
171. Id. at 375 (“Common sense may seem a rather obvious virtue, but it is under heavy attack 
today as an enemy of both intellectual and social progress. Neither of these attacks is well 
founded.”). 
172. Daniel A. Farber, From the Stacks: “Too Clever By Half: The Case Against Brilliance”, 
THE NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 1, 1986, retrieved from https://newrepublic.com/article/113904/daniel-
farbers-too-clever-half-case-against-brilliance.  
173. Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, supra note 169, at 920. 
174. Id. at 925-26 (“A brilliant theory is by definition one that would not occur to most people. 
It is hard to see how the vast majority of the population can be presumed to have agreed to 
something that they could not conceive of. . . . A related kind of brilliant argument is to show that 
some judicial opinion, or set of judicial opinions, has a dazzlingly unexpected meaning.”). 
175. Id. at 376. 
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to be transferred from the cognition of one person to the cognition of 
another person. So, he understands the legal opinion as the explanation, 
which results in transference of the understanding from the judge to the 
audience. This might be described as a Cartesian approach (i.e., based on 
the philosophy of Descartes) to “Legal Philosophy.” However, there are 
other schools of philosophy that do not begin with the “separate idea” 
for cognition. From the perspective of Philosophy of Language, the 
pertinent question is language usage with respect to the “brilliant” idea 
as opposed merely to transference of understanding. Likewise, from the 
perspective of Philosophy of Science, a brilliant idea may be reflected in 
a new hypothesis as to causation.176 Nonetheless, Farber is essentially 
correct from the perspective of Moral Philosophy where an individual 
person must be able to determine right and wrong by a known standard, 
even if the given moral standard is subjective. If the individual trying to 
make that determination is unable to cognize moral behavior, then he 
technically cannot engage in moral behavior. Indeed, the problem of 
legal right premised on moral standards as a theory of punishment was 
addressed by GWF Hegel and other legal scholars some time ago.177 
C. Is Philosophy and Tax Law Merely a Sub-Discipline of Legal
Philosophy?
Legal Philosophy is a tool for lawyers in justifying laws or
explaining why or how judges render decisions. Although these are 
possible projects for tax lawyers, they are not their only projects. Several 
differences of tax jurisprudence in comparison to legal jurisprudence are 
accordingly premised, in part, on different projects. Some of these 
differences are as follows: First, tax law has traditionally been 
considered related to natural law jurisprudence.178 This differentiates 
from much of the modern legal analysis which has shifted away from 
natural law jurisprudence centuries ago. Second, tax lawyers are often 
transactional lawyers and, thus, more concerned with tax planning and 
less concerned with adjudicative methods than non-tax lawyers. Third, 
tax scholars are often engaged with economists in the derivation of tax 
176. In the history of economic ideas, where Keynes proposed that monetary policy could be
used to smooth economic cycles the problem was not at all with the understanding of the underlying 
idea. The issue was merely whether the Keynesian proposal for economic cause-and-effect 
represented an idea that could be tested by falsification.   
177. See Peter G. Stillman, Hegel’s Idea of Punishment, 14:2 HIST. OF PHIL. 169, 172 (1976); 
Michael Salter, Justifying Private Property Rights: A Message from Hegel´s Jurisprudential 
Writings, 7 LEGAL STUD. 245, 246 (1987). 
178. See Peters, supra note 40. 
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policy. Tax lawyers thereby function in the role of tax policymakers and 
not legal advisors. Fourth, tax laws in most jurisdictions are usually a 
composite of statutes plus common law authorities. 
The internal debates of Legal Philosophy premised on one method 
or the other are accordingly less relevant to tax lawyers who are required 
to know both methods. Notwithstanding that all of these methods are 
plausible explanations why the philosophy of tax law is not a sub-
discipline of Legal Philosophy, the most obvious explanation may be 
simply that legal philosophers have eschewed tax law. None of the great 
scholars focused on tax law in discussing legal philosophy. So, while 
Dworkin and Hart were having their famous debates on legal 
philosophy, tax lawyers were debating Locke and Nozick. 
D. Why is Chief Justice Roberts Opposed to Law and Philosophy?
Perhaps the most visible criticism of Law and Philosophy in recent
years came from the Chief Justice himself. Chief Justice Roberts 
famously wrote in the Sebelius opinion as follows: “To an economist, 
perhaps, there is no difference between activity and inactivity; both have 
measurable economic effects on commerce. But the distinction between 
doing something and doing nothing would not have been lost on the 
Framers, who were ‘practical statesmen,’ not metaphysical 
philosophers.”179 
For purposes of this paper, the comments of the Chief Justice are 
significant; if philosophy functions as a tool for lawyers, and the Chief 
Justice does not see philosophy as a useful tool in rendering judicial 
opinions, then this merits further explanation. 
One explanation for why judges might reach the conclusion that 
philosophy is not helpful to law is that judges see their own decisions as 
determinate. And, the circumstance that judges might see particularly 
their own decisions as determinate is hardly surprising. Many judicial 
opinions openly state that the result of the decision was inevitable for 
some reason or another. But, that cannot be true in all cases, and 
probably isn’t really true in many cases at all, since lawyers do not 
179. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132. S. Ct. 2566, 2589 (2012); see also John G. 
Roberts, Jr., C.J. U.S. Interview at Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Annual Conference, at approx. 
30:40 (June 25, 2011), www.c-span.org/video/?300203-1/conversation-chief-justice-roberts (“Pick 
up a copy of any law review that you see and the first article is likely to be, you know, the influence 
of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th-century Bulgaria, or something, which I’m 
sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn’t of much help to the bar.”); see also 
Edwards, supra note 35; Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 
1326 (2002). 
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choose to litigate cases with inherently determinate outcomes. Litigation 
is by definition largely outcome indeterminate. Aggressive tax planning 
is generally even more indeterminate than litigation. But, if determinate 
results can always be imagined by the judge in deciding a case using 
stare decisis as Charles Collier has proposed, then there is clearly no 
need for philosophy in legal practice.180 And, this is especially true in tax 
law where positivist tax scholars continually argue that “black letter 
law” is the only interpretational method available for tax law. 
But, at least in Supreme Court decisions in the United States, the 
Court is called upon to decide a particular case on a novel set of facts. 
The Sebelius decision is a case in point where Chief Justice Roberts 
authorized the Obamacare penalty as a “tax.”181 Much of the tax law 
community was shocked by this holding from the Chief Justice and 
could not have predicted it in a million years. The privileging of 
determinate outcomes in judicial decisions may also entail an idea of the 
facts of cases as always essentially the same. Or determinant outcomes 
may stem from the idea that situations allow judges to distill (or, think 
they are able to distill) new cases down to a prior known set of facts to 
which judges already know the answer. Judges are, of course, perfectly 
able to determinatively adjudicate the same case over and over again. 
Yet, apart from the judge who is able to divine his own opinions on any 
imaginable future case, or the judge who is willing to argue that the facts 
of the case really were not distinguishable from a prior case, the rest of 
the world sees judicial adjudication under the common law as outcome 
indeterminate, and particularly, the tax-related decisions of the Roberts 
court.182 As Singer wrote: 
Determinacy is necessary to the ideology of the rule of law, for both 
theorists and judges. It is the only way judges can appear to apply the 
law rather than make it. Determinate rules and arguments are desirable 
because they restrain arbitrary judicial power. At the same time, de-
terminacy is threatening. A completely determinate set of rules would 
require judges to apply existing rules mechanically even in unforeseen 
circumstances where the policy underlying the rule might not apply.183 
Another explanation for the exclusion of philosophy from judicial 
opinions is that “philosophy” actually means policymaking. Neomi Rao 
180. See Charles Collier, Precedent and Legal Authority: A Critical History, 1988 WIS. L.
REV. 771 (1988).  
181. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566. 
182. See Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
183. Joseph W. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 
12 (1984). 
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wrote as follows: 
The Court should . . . stay clear of philosophy and base its decisions on 
history, precedent, and a recognition of the limits of judicial authority. 
Three major distinctions between the philosophical and judicial enter-
prises compel this conclusion. First, judicial decision making is a prac-
tical activity . . . . Second, judges must work within institutional con-
straints in a political system that requires separation of powers. . . . 
Finally, judges in the Anglo-American legal system are bound by legal 
precedent, and draw legitimacy from references to cultural and politi-
cal history.184 
Rao thus argues (similar to Schön) that tax adjudication using 
philosophy as opposed to “black letter” law is a form of what amounts to 
“sociology.”185 Nonetheless, Philosophy of Language has the potential 
to be very helpful to legal interpretation.186 That is, if there is an idea 
accepted as a matter of international tax law, with agreement-in-use as to 
particular tax terms, it is possible for the meaning of terms to shift to 
cover new situations. We know the shift in the meaning of words occurs 
based on the heuristics of the international tax profession. For example, 
a “resident” entitled to a treaty might be understood as a matter of 
international tax law not to include certain hybrid entities used in 
aggressive tax avoidance.187 In that case, the meaning of tax treaties 
could perhaps be objectively known by the linguistic standards of 
international tax lawyers and not determined solely by the “interpreter.” 
The use of philosophy thereby informs the method of legal 
interpretation, which is not a form of “back-door” policymaking even 
though it may lead to different policy results. So, as it turned out, 
philosophy actually furthers, not hinders, all of the goals set by Rao for 
legal interpretation.188 
184. Neomi Rao, A Backdoor to Policy Making: The Use of Philosophers by the Supreme
Court, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1371-72 (1998). 
185. See Stephen Feldman, Diagnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal Scholarship and
Judicial Practice (with an Emphasis on the Teague Rule against New Rules in Habeas Corpus 
Cases), 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1046, 1087-88 (1994) (“Judges largely do not listen to or even care about 
what legal scholars write. On the other hand, normative language or discourse represents a 
manifestation of power itself. . . . By telling us that we must choose or this or that path, normative 
discourse consistently and repetitively reminds us that we are free to choose whichever path is the 
most appealing.”). 
186. See Ulf Linderfalk, Is Treaty Interpretation an Art or a Science? International Law and
Rational Decision Making, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 169, 175 (2015). 
187. See AVI-YONAH, supra note 110, at 92 (“The French tax authorities generally deny
residence when the recipient of income is not effectively subject to tax.”). 
188. Rao, supra note 184. 
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IV. INTERDISCIPLINARITY IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
Interdisciplinarity is present in legal scholarship. Tax law analysis 
typically includes the use of principles from accounting, economics, 
psychology, and perhaps other disciplines relevant to taxation.189 An 
illustration of an interdisciplinary approach would be to use psychology 
to analyze tax law, which Kirchler clearly has done with the “slippery 
slope” framework, for example.190 Notably, scholars have opposed 
interdisciplinary scholarship in law both on the grounds that law builds 
itself from other disciplines,191 and that law has been taken over by other 
disciplines.192 However, if tax legal analysis is performed with reference 
to the consequences, which is the method now applied by the U.S. 
Supreme Court after Sebelius and Wynne, then non-legal fields are 
surely relevant to legal analysis. 
Yet, philosophy may be understood not so much as 
interdisciplinary scholarship but as instructions on how to better employ 
an existing tool, or even how not to use an existing tool. Thus, in the 
context of interdisciplinary work in philosophy and law, scholars have 
opposed the idea of using a philosophical source as authority in law.193 
The quintessential idea seems to be a hypothetical situation where a 
judge cites a philosopher as the authority for rendering a decision in a 
case, rather than applicable legal precedent, thereby violating the “rule 
of law.”194 However, a citation to an actual case where that might have 
occurred in practice never seems to be provided (thus rendering the 
entirety of the discussion largely hypothetical).195 In most cases arising 
in the real world, a judge, or even a tax lawyer engaged in tax planning, 
might be expected to use philosophy to augment interpretation of legal 
authority and not to substitute for it. Collier argued that because the 
189. TAXATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO RESEARCH (Margaret Lamb et al. eds.
Oxford Univ. Press 2004).  
190. Erich Kirchler, Erik Hoelzl, & Ingrid Wahl, supra note 118.
191. See Phillip Areeda, Always a Borrower: Law and Other Disciplines, 1988 DUKE L.J. 
1029 (1988). 
192. See McCloskey, supra note 85. 
193. See Charles Collier, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship in Search of a Paradigm, 42
DUKE L.J. 840 (1993). 
194. See Rebecca Prebble & John Prebble, Does the Use of General Anti-Avoidance Rules to
Combat Tax Avoidance Breach Principles of the Rule of Law?, 55 SLU L.J. 21 (2010); see also 
Coleman & Leiter, supra note 6, at 580-83 (“There are at least three other motivations for 
attributing to liberalism (as a normative political theory) a commitment to determinacy as a political 
ideal. Two of these have to do with ‘rule-of-law’ considerations. First, legal outcomes must be 
determinate if individuals are to be put on notice as to their duties under the law and be provided 
with an opportunity to conform their behavior accordingly.”).  
195. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 184. 
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humanities have little application to law and philosophers, they should 
not be cited as a source of “intellectual authority,” and also because they 
might imply an alternative to precedential authority in the common 
law.196 
Other scholars have focused on the quality of the knowledge of the 
lawyer as a means to criticize interdisciplinary law scholarship. Francis 
Mootz wrote: “Interdisciplinary research will yield no insight if the legal 
theorist (or philosopher) demonstrates an inadequate understanding of 
philosophy (or law).”197 However, with respect to interdisciplinary 
research, the issue is not the respective skill of the craftsman in using the 
philosophical tool. Rather, the need for new methods arises based on the 
difficulty of the respective project. A tax lawyer that is interested in 
interdisciplinary scholarship most likely has a problem where the 
existing tool does not seem to work very well. Thus, in instances where 
the tax lawyer begins to make enhancements to tools, it is often done out 
of necessity with the intent to use the tool for some immediate and 
practical project in tax law; we should therefore expect to see 
interdisciplinary aspects arise within the actual practice of tax law. 
Most of what tax lawyers are doing on a daily basis is some 
interdisciplinary combination of accounting, economics, or psychology. 
Examples might be financial reporting, transfer pricing, or drafting tax 
statutes. Philosophy bears on all these disciplines and, therefore, bears 
on law. If philosophy functions as a tool for tax lawyers, then 
interdisciplinary research represents the creation of an entirely new 
hybrid tool. This is distinguishable from multidisciplinary scholarship 
where multiple tools are applied, in turn to the same problem.198 An 
example of this hybrid-”tool” effect is Critical Legal Studies. As 
Coleman & Leiter wrote in respect of Critical Legal Studies: 
“[L]iberalism is committed to the law being determinate, objective and 
neutral. According to CLS, the problem with liberalism is that none of 
these ideals obtain in legal practice. Law is neither determinate, 
objective, nor neutral.”199 These arguments, including the assertion that 
law reflects power relations in society, represent a possible new “tool” in 
the toolkit for tax lawyers. The new tool is comprised of a combination 
of “deconstructive” philosophy and Legal Philosophy as a new approach 
196. Charles Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law: Reexamining the
Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 41 DUKE L.J. 191 (1991).  
197. Francis J. Mootz III, Law and Philosophy, Philosophy and Law, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 127, 
128 (1995). 
198. See, e.g., AVI-YONAH, supra note 110. 
199. Coleman & Leiter, supra note 6, at 549.
41
Bogenschneider: A Philosophy Toolkit for Tax Lawyers
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
492 AKRON LAW REVIEW [50:451 
to the theory of law. And, particularly with respect to tax law, that 
method seems particularly suited to addressing questions of what tax 
scholars refer to as “equity,” both “vertical” and “horizontal” equity.200 
The various scholars who have argued Critical Legal Studies has burned 
itself out are wrong because it need not be the tool exclusively chosen by 
tax lawyers all the time. In other words, the expectations that Critical 
Legal Studies would become the only tool lawyers would choose to use 
for all tax projects are misguided. Likewise, the idea of some Tax Crit 
scholars that new tax words could be proposed that would immediately 
cross-off (and thereby supplant) all existing tax words are misguided.201 
Yet, it is not impossible that over time a new hybrid tool derived 
from interdisciplinary scholarship could be found to be very useful as a 
“tool” and thereby become the de-facto tool-of-choice for tax lawyers in 
most projects. As it stands, Tax Crit has not achieved that level of utility, 
and functions now as akin to the claw on the backside of the hammer 
that is used to pull out a bent nail. However, other examples of 
interdisciplinary scholarship in tax law, reflecting the cross-over of other 
areas, such as economic psychology, or Philosophy of Language, do 
represent “tools” for tax scholars that can be broadly applied to a variety 
of projects. 
V. CONCLUSION
Philosophy is highly beneficial to the practicing tax lawyer or 
scholar. Philosophy renders explicit the philosophical foundations that 
are implicit in the study of taxation and practice of tax law. The use of 
philosophy allows adjudication or tax policy-making to be approached in 
ways that are more transparent and intentional. As such, the working 
knowledge of philosophy provides what amounts to choice-of-tool to the 
tax lawyer. Such enhanced flexibility allows tax lawyers to do existing 
jobs better, but it also allows tax lawyers to take on other jobs that might 
not have seemed possible with a very limited toolset. Interdisciplinary 
scholarship is essentially the fashioning of a new tool by the tax lawyer, 
200. Bret N. Bogenschneider, Critical Legal Studies and Regressive Taxation in the United
States, 10 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL L. 98, 99 (2015); Livingston, supra note 155, at 1796 (“In 
practice, vertical equity tends to get less attention than the remaining categories, at least where 
academic lawyers are concerned.”). But see Infanti, supra note 149, at 1194-95 (“Yet, despite these 
critiques, all mention of horizontal and vertical equity has far from disappeared from the pages of 
law reviews. Both ‘mainstream’ and critical tax scholars have embraced horizontal and vertical 
equity in their contributions to the tax policy literature; indeed, there has been some debate about 
whether critical tax theory raises issues of horizontal as opposed to vertical equity.”). 
201. See, e.g., Infanti, supra note 149, at 1194. 
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usually out of necessity, in encountering a new project. The various 
criticisms rendered against law and philosophy, many with clever names 
such as “intellectual voyeurism”202 or “case against brilliance” are 
objections both in respect to tax lawyers using new philosophical tools 
and also the fashioning of new interdisciplinary philosophical tools. 
Leiter’s “voyeurism” argument against the use of philosophy in law 
amounts to the idea that lawyers are not trained to use philosophical 
power-tools and should just stick to conventional hammers. However, 
there are many ways to correctly use philosophy in respect of law that 
Leiter has not addressed, and many other ways to incorrectly use 
philosophy in respect of law, also not addressed.203 Furthermore, other 
usages for philosophy that future scholars will someday devise for the 
benefit of the field of law are impossible for us to anticipate today. 
Tax law has been excluded thus far from Philosophy of Law. 
Accordingly, the foremost intellectual “crime” against law may not be 
not “intellectual voyeurism,” but rather this de-emphasis of discovery 
where new ideas in legal scholarship are discouraged. Karl Popper 
identified such forms of argumentation applied in defense of the status 
quo in his description of “conventionalism” with an emphasis on 
scientific discovery.204 
Contrary to the idea that philosophy functions as a “back door” 
form of “policy,” a strict “letter of the law” interpretational method 
leaves a substantial discretion to the legal “interpreter” to potentially 
engage in “sociology” in the guise of legal interpretation. The further 
idea that philosophy actually is policy represents confusion with legal 
methods versus legal outcomes. Philosophy represents the disclosure of 
the theory upon which the policy outcome was premised. Yet, 
philosophy does not require one particular outcome. As Critical Legal 
Studies has shown, legal interpretations are unlikely to be given from a 
universal “objective” perspective.205 The proffered “normative” versus 
“objective” method of legal interpretation is not helpful with respect to 
tax law; whenever any scientist or legal scholar sets forth a new 
hypothesis or drafts a legal opinion, this generally does not reflect an 
objective analysis of a statute toward a determinative outcome. 
Furthermore, in tax law, multinational firms are continually 
202. Leiter, supra note 162.
203. For example, Leiter does not address the displacement of tax law by economics or other
disciplines which obviously do not proceed from the perspective of Legal Philosophy. See Peter 
Goodrich, Social Science and the Displacement of Law, 32 L. & SOC’Y REV. 473 (1998).  
204. POPPER, supra note 7. 
205. Kennedy, supra note 143.
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“manufacturing” new sets of facts to test the boundaries of determinative 
outcomes in the positive law, and that must always go beyond situations 
anticipated by the legal drafters leading to indeterminacy. 
Philosophy is the means to solve tax problems; so, when we say 
that Adam Smith’s , John Locke’s, or John Rawls’ ideas are applied by 
tax scholars to address issues arising under the tax law, that is to say that 
those philosophies function as tools that tax lawyers generally think are 
helpful tools. However, in a situation where particular philosophies do 
not work very well for tax lawyers, then scholars should consider the use 
of alternative philosophical tools. The descriptions of schools of 
philosophy given herein are illustrations of those tools that are currently 
being used both within and without the tax law. In addition to those 
tools, others are possible. Inevitably, tax lawyers will encounter 
“paradigm shifts,” such as the recent BEPS initiative by the OECD, and 
tax lawyers will need to learn to work with that new tool.206 Economic 
psychology is a good example of a new tool whereby “taxpayer morale” 
turns out to be perhaps the primary factor in the overall functioning of a 
tax system. 
Interdisciplinary scholarship can produce new tools by employing 
the combination of methods to resolve some particular problem that tax 
lawyers are grappling with at a particular point in time. This does not 
require that tax lawyers stop using hammers to hammer nails. First and 
foremost, legal pluralism, as akin to scientific pluralism, means 
flexibility of the method and the use of various philosophies when the 
need arises.207 The use of a tool subject to “falsification” means that 
lawyers should apply familiar forms of philosophy as tools unless some 
other tool can be shown to work better for a given project. The ability to 
employ a variety of “tools” to solve a variety of problems that may arise 
in the practice of law is the best description of a quality lawyer, and 
particularly so with respect to tax lawyers. 
206. See OECD BEPS Initiative. 
207. See FEYERABEND, supra note 22. 
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